Earlier this month, a group of self-styled progressive organizations—including the Center for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR, a group with significant ties to Hamas), the Jewish group If Not Now, and the U.S. Presbyterian Church—petitioned Congress not to support the normalization agreements that Israel has signed with four Arab countries, as well as further peacemaking efforts in this vein. While this view might be extreme, it’s worth noting that, in a bizarre exchange in the early days of the Biden administration, a State Department official appeared reluctant even to use the term “Abraham Accords” to describe these agreements. David M. Weinberg comments on this hostility to good relations between former adversaries:

[Contrary to the claims] of the American “progressive” groups mentioned above, the Abraham Accords are not a Trump-tainted gimmick or a Netanyahu-stained end-run around the Palestinians. Rather, they are an authentic breakthrough for both peace and security in the Middle East; a transformation that evinces staying power and deepens by the day.

To assert that only Trumpian razzle-dazzle and arms deals were the basis for the Abraham Accords, as do [these] partisan grouches, is a complete misread of Emirati, Bahraini, and Moroccan purposes in pursuit of peace with Israel. The leaders of the countries want to redefine the self-understanding and global image of Arab Muslims by blending tradition with enlightenment, anchored in an admirable discourse of religious moderation and broadmindedness.

Affiliating with Israel fits perfectly into this agenda because this is exactly how they view Israel too—as a nation that successfully synthesizes strong ethnic and religious identity with modernity. Therefore, the Abraham Accords are deeply rooted in genuine ideological intentions, as well as urgent security realties, and are locked-in for the long term.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.