Israel Needs to Head Off a Ramadan Wave of Violence before It Starts

March 29 2022

This weekend, the Muslim holy month of Ramadan commences—a time of prayer and celebration for most, but also a time that usually sees an uptick in Palestinian terrorism. The flurry of Jewish activity in preparation for Passover, which begins in mid-April, will likely provide additional targets, and motivation, for terrorists. After the deadly stabbing in Be’er Sheva a week ago, and another in Hadera on Sunday, writes Yoav Limor, Israel must be on high alert

Unlike the terrorist attack in Be’er Sheva last week, Sunday’s incident seemed more premeditated. Not one terrorist who acts for personal motives, but two gunmen with a small arsenal and automatic weapons, [carried it out]. The past month has seen nine terrorist attacks that left six people dead. Such a sequence of events cannot be coincidental. Even if each attack stands on its own, there is a clear sense that they draw inspiration from each other. This is certainly true in the case of the Beersheba and Hadera attacks, carried out by Arab Israelis who were Islamic State sympathizers.

The growing involvement of Arab Israelis in terrorism is an issue that must now top the government’s agenda. True, this is a fringe minority that cannot be projected on the entire sector, and yet—it is impossible to turn a blind eye to the mounting events, certainly given the riots that took place during Operation Guardian of the Walls in May 2021.

This [problem] is further compounded by the growing anarchy in the Arab sector and the loss of governance in large parts of the Negev and the Galilee. It is high time to take action and introduce a real, detailed, budgeted national plan, and to stop treating the matter as if we are fated to tolerate it.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: ISIS, Israeli Arabs, Palestinian terror, Ramadan

Israel’s Syria Strategy in a Changing Middle East

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.

Read more at Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security

More about: Donald Trump, Israeli Security, Syria, U.S. Foreign policy