On Sunday, the Ukrainian president Volodymyr Zelensky urged Israel to send more aid to his country, particularly the Iron Dome missile-defense system. As Jim Geraghty points out, this request may not be reasonable or even feasible, given Israel’s precarious relations with Russia and the logistical hazards of shipping the system’s components through a war zone.

At least based upon publicly available information, Israel still doesn’t have as many [Iron Dome] batteries as it would like to have, and the country doesn’t have any spares lying around. If Israel did choose to ship an Iron Dome battery to Ukraine, it would have to choose an area to leave unguarded. And as we’ve noted, those systems are very expensive to replace.

Then there’s the question of transferring the weapons system to the Ukrainians. The good news is that Iron Dome systems are meant to be mobile, and the components can be relatively easily transported by truck. In 2020, the U.S. began putting its two Iron Dome systems on Oshkosh trucks—and it brought those U.S. trucks to Israel on an Antonov 225 cargo plane, the largest plane in the world.

Alas, only one Antonov 225 cargo plane was ever produced—and it was destroyed in the Battle of Antonov Airport outside Kyiv on February 24.

Even if the Israelis broke down an Iron Dome system into smaller and more easily transported parts, flying it into Ukraine through contested airspace is likely to be deemed too risky. With these systems so valuable and expensive, neither Israel nor Ukraine would want to risk some Russian pilot getting lucky. . . . Then there’s the question of how quickly the Ukrainians can get trained to use the new system. As of September, the U.S. was having a difficult time getting its two delivered systems up and running.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.