Yesterday, a Palestinian stabbed a passenger on an Israeli bus—leaving him seriously wounded. The attack was but the latest in a wave of terror that has left eleven dead since last week, and threatens to become worse with the beginning of Ramadan this weekend. Yoav Limor explains what the Jewish state can do to curb the violence:

If there is one conclusion that needs to be reached, it is the need for Israel to regain control. . . . Israel cannot evade the need to launch a comprehensive wave of arrests and confiscation of illegal guns in the Arab sector as a way of thwarting attacks and creating deterrence. When it comes to the Palestinians, Israel will need to deploy more forces to prevent terrorist attacks, while trying to maintain a certain degree of normalcy during Ramadan.

An operation of this kind should be coordinated with the Palestinian Authority, which will now find itself embarrassed in light of the fact that the terrorist behind the Bnei Brak attack [on Tuesday] was one of its own. East Jerusalem will be the main challenge, as Jewish, Christian, and Muslim holidays are coinciding this year in a volatile time period that culminates with Independence Day.

It must call up forces, display a military presence, operate everywhere, at all times, to give the enemy—and the Israeli public—the sense that the government is in Jerusalem and not in the hands of anyone who grabs a gun and plots an attack.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.