In Israel in the past two weeks, acts of terror have left eleven dead, while security services foiled additional attacks. On Friday, border police raided a West Bank terrorist cell, resulting in a shoot-out that left three Palestinian gunmen dead and an Israeli officer severely wounded. The weekend saw Arabs riot in Jerusalem’s Old City. Yossi Kuperwasser seeks out the reasons for this escalation of violence, and notes several features that distinguish it from previous outbreaks: the involvement of Arab Israelis, the attackers’ affiliation with Islamic State (IS), and the fact that, unlike much terrorism of the past few years, most of the attacks have taken place within the pre-1967 borders.

The Israeli government and the security services wanted to believe . . . that by improving the economic situation in the Palestinian Authority’s areas and Gaza, they could gain at least temporary quiet and muddle through the sensitive period of the religious and nationalist holidays in April and May. They believed that the Palestinian Authority (PA) would fight terror in the areas under its control, and Hamas would preserve calm and restrain the other factions in Gaza. Pouring money into the Israeli-Arab society was also considered a way of bolstering their interest in integrating into Israeli society and keeping them away from violent and criminal activities. Although these assumptions may be correct, they miss the point.

The PA and Hamas, as well as elements of the pragmatic leadership of the Israeli Arabs, may take advantage of the economic gestures and deliver what is expected of them, but they are not in full control of the terror threats. In addition, more disturbingly, the PA and Hamas continue to stoke terror and hatred, and Hamas calls for terror from the areas not under its control, including by Arabs in Judea and Samaria and within Israel.

The Palestinian Authority chairman Mahmoud Abbas is responsible for much of the incitement, in part through his insistence on paying salaries to arrested terrorists and monthly stipends to the families of killed terrorists. His expenditures will now include payments to the families of the terrorists killed in the latest attacks and confrontations with the security forces, and to arrested terrorists. Yet, Abbas avoided any reference to the first and second attacks, and only under Israeli and American pressure did he issue a very feeble condemnation of the third. Meanwhile, the Fatah movement, which he leads, and its terror arm, the al-Aqsa Brigades, praised the attacks.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.