According to reports from the Syrian media, the IDF launched missiles at Iranian-linked military sites on Sunday, killing four Syrian airmen. If the information is accurate, the attack constitutes yet another Israeli mission in the “war between the wars,” as Jerusalem calls its yearslong attempt to degrade and destroy the military assets that Tehran and its allies have been building up in war-torn Syria. Israel has so far sought to conduct this campaign without antagonizing Russia, which is fighting alongside Iran to keep Bashar al-Assad in power. The Alma Research and Education Center examines how the war in Ukraine might affect both the Islamic Republic’s efforts and the Jewish state’s plans to counter them:

Russia will not abandon the Syrian [theater], which it considers a strategic arena, leaving it in the hands of the Iranians. . . . It is clear that Russian forces have been transferred from Syria to Ukraine, but the extent of the forces redeployed is not clear to us.

If Russia should become “unsatisfied” with the Israeli campaign-between-the-wars activity in Syria in particular, and with Israeli policy in general (also in the context of the war in Ukraine), its response poses a challenge for Israel. The Russian responses can be conveyed . . . in the passing on of: preliminary intelligence regarding Israeli attack intentions to the Syrians and/or Iranians, after-the-fact publicity regarding the details of an Israeli attack, the transfer of advanced conventional weapons to the Syrians (S-300 air-defense batteries for example), and “turning a blind eye” when conventional Russian advanced weapons are transferred from Syria to elements of the radical Shiite axis led by Iran.

Until now, the IDF has maintained contacts with Russian commanders in Syria to ensure that none of its airstrikes harm Russian troops or materiel. What would happen if the Kremlin were to cut off the channels of communication?

Israel will know how to conduct itself militarily in Syria, even without coordination with the Russians. This would require more intelligence efforts to rule out a Russian presence.

A scenario in which Russian air-force planes stationed in Syria will take action against Israeli air-force planes in our assessment is a scenario with a . . . very low probability. However, should such a scenario occur, the Russian pilots would have to deal with technology and pilots of a different standard than they have come up against to date. In such a case, this would not be the first time Russian pilots would fight directly against the IDF in general and against the Israeli Air Force. About 50 years ago (the late 1960s and early 1970s), Russian soldiers pilots acted directly, within the framework of the Egyptian army, against Israel.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.