According to reports from the Syrian media, the IDF launched missiles at Iranian-linked military sites on Sunday, killing four Syrian airmen. If the information is accurate, the attack constitutes yet another Israeli mission in the “war between the wars,” as Jerusalem calls its yearslong attempt to degrade and destroy the military assets that Tehran and its allies have been building up in war-torn Syria. Israel has so far sought to conduct this campaign without antagonizing Russia, which is fighting alongside Iran to keep Bashar al-Assad in power. The Alma Research and Education Center examines how the war in Ukraine might affect both the Islamic Republic’s efforts and the Jewish state’s plans to counter them:

Russia will not abandon the Syrian [theater], which it considers a strategic arena, leaving it in the hands of the Iranians. . . . It is clear that Russian forces have been transferred from Syria to Ukraine, but the extent of the forces redeployed is not clear to us.

If Russia should become “unsatisfied” with the Israeli campaign-between-the-wars activity in Syria in particular, and with Israeli policy in general (also in the context of the war in Ukraine), its response poses a challenge for Israel. The Russian responses can be conveyed . . . in the passing on of: preliminary intelligence regarding Israeli attack intentions to the Syrians and/or Iranians, after-the-fact publicity regarding the details of an Israeli attack, the transfer of advanced conventional weapons to the Syrians (S-300 air-defense batteries for example), and “turning a blind eye” when conventional Russian advanced weapons are transferred from Syria to elements of the radical Shiite axis led by Iran.

Until now, the IDF has maintained contacts with Russian commanders in Syria to ensure that none of its airstrikes harm Russian troops or materiel. What would happen if the Kremlin were to cut off the channels of communication?

Israel will know how to conduct itself militarily in Syria, even without coordination with the Russians. This would require more intelligence efforts to rule out a Russian presence.

A scenario in which Russian air-force planes stationed in Syria will take action against Israeli air-force planes in our assessment is a scenario with a . . . very low probability. However, should such a scenario occur, the Russian pilots would have to deal with technology and pilots of a different standard than they have come up against to date. In such a case, this would not be the first time Russian pilots would fight directly against the IDF in general and against the Israeli Air Force. About 50 years ago (the late 1960s and early 1970s), Russian soldiers pilots acted directly, within the framework of the Egyptian army, against Israel.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.