Nominated by the Biden administration to serve as America’s ambassador to Brazil, Elizabeth Frawley Bagley has held diplomatic positions in every Democratic administration since Jimmy Carter, including a stint as ambassador to Portugal from 1994 until 1997. Adam Kredo, who obtained a copy of an interview Bagley gave in 1998, examines some of its more alarming content, which also disturbed two members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:

The interview was conducted by a historian at the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training for an oral history project. . . . Bagley opened up about the “Jewish lobby” and its impact on Democratic party politics. She was asked about “the Israeli influence” on the Clinton administration.

“There is always the influence of the Jewish lobby because there is major money involved,” Bagley said. . . . Democrats, she said, “always tend to go with the Jewish constituency on Israel and say stupid things, like moving the capital to Jerusalem always comes up. Things that we shouldn’t even touch.”

The “Jewish factor” is not about the raw number of electors who care about these issues, Bagley said, “it’s money.”

When questioned about these remarks during a May 18 confirmation hearing with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Bagley claimed they were the result of a “free-flowing discussion” with the interviewer.

Bagley’s assertion that the discussion was “free-flowing” hardly exonerates her. Meanwhile, the “stupid” decision to relocate the U.S. embassy to Israel’s capital—supported by decades of bipartisan legislation—did not bring about any international crises, and was instead followed by major breakthroughs in Israel-Arab peacemaking.

In a sense, the most successful negotiation with Hamas was the recent agreement securing the release of Edan Alexander, the last living hostage with a U.S. passport. Unlike those previously handed over, he wasn’t exchanged for Palestinian prisoners, and there was no cease-fire. Dan Diker explains what Hamas got out of the deal:

Alexander’s unconditional release [was] designed to legitimize Hamas further as a viable negotiator and to keep Hamas in power, particularly at a moment when Israel is expanding its military campaign to conquer Gaza and eliminate Hamas as a military, political, and civil power. Israel has no other option than defeating Hamas. Hamas’s “humanitarian” move encourages American pressure on Israel to end its counterterrorism war in service of advancing additional U.S. efforts to release hostages over time, legitimizing Hamas while it rearms, resupplies, and reestablishes it military power and control.

In fact, Hamas-affiliated media have claimed credit for successful negotiations with the U.S., branding the release of Edan Alexander as the “Edan deal,” portraying Hamas as a rising international player, sidelining Israel from direct talks with DC, and declaring this a “new phase in the conflict.”

Fortunately, however, Washington has not coerced Jerusalem into ceasing the war since Alexander’s return. Nor, Diker observes, did the deal drive a wedge between the two allies, despite much speculation about the possibility.