Tomorrow, the U.S. assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs will arrive in Ramallah to meet with Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority (PA). In a phone call last week, Abbas—who was elected to a four-year term in 2005 and has not stood for reelection since—reportedly told Secretary of State Antony Blinken, “I am done. This is the end.” Kobi Michael and Ori Wertman comment on Abbas’s strategic impasse:

The manifest weakness of Mahmoud Abbas’s leadership—and the PA’s failures in the field of governance—thus pose for Israel, and the world, a poor but inevitable choice among sub-optimal conflict management, the alternative of localized centers of power, or the dangerous rise to dominance of more radical elements. . . . [B]ased on the evidence of the last 28 years, . . . the basic drivers for this failure and the reasons why it cannot easily be undone can be found in the PA’s own conduct.

The main cause of failure, . . . can be identified in the failure of the Palestinian leadership—first of Yasir Arafat and then Mahmoud Abbas, each in his own distinct way—to carry out the necessary transition from a revolutionary movement . . . to a real and painstaking process of state-building. This would have required a change in the aspects of consciousness, organization, and political behavior, which did not come about.

The PA, which failed to read the global and regional map and continued to adhere to the internationalization strategy while deepening the rift and disconnect with both Israel and the U.S., has also failed to change its ways regarding the other reasons that have led to its failure. As a result, the Palestinian economy has continued to falter and its dependence on the Israeli economy is still complete; civil society has remained paralyzed and persecuted; and state institutions continue to be characterized largely by dysfunction saturated with corruption and nepotism.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.