After North Vietnam invaded and dismantled their country in 1975, hundreds of thousands of South Vietnamese fled—often on rickety or unseaworthy vessels. Israel opened its doors to a number of them, many of whom still live there with their descendants. Avi Kumar writes:

From 1977 to 1979, Menachem Begin permitted entry to around 360 of the so-called Vietnamese “boat people,” in the aftermath of the Communist takeover of the Southeast Asian nation. At the time, Begin justified his actions by citing parallels with Jews struggling to find refuge during the Holocaust. Of those granted asylum in Israel, most settled around Jaffa and Bat Yam; the community is today estimated to number around 150 to 200.

Tongi Noyan, twenty-eight, [the child of two such refugees], works as a real-estate broker in Tel Aviv. He speaks perfect Hebrew, with no accent, and a casual observer might initially assume—given his Asian appearance—that he is a Jew from some far-flung corner of the Diaspora. Or perhaps a recent convert.

The Noyan family opened a Chinese restaurant in Herzliya in 1985, called Asia. After more than three decades in business, it closed in 2020 due to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Tongi has fond memories of helping out after school, as a child. During the Chinese New Year, they made Vietnamese dishes due to popular demand, including pho soup, banh bao (dumplings), and Vietnamese spring rolls. Tongi also recalls how American Jews would follow the same tradition they had back home and go out for Chinese food on Christmas Day.

While noting that many members of the community have since left Israel for the United States, France, or other countries, including Vietnam, to him the Jewish state is home. “Of course, I’m a true Israeli. I love surfing in the morning, I speak Hebrew, I was born and raised here,” he said.

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.