Last month, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt reached an agreement according to which Egypt will pump natural gas through Syria to Lebanon, thus alleviating the last country’s severe energy shortages. Despite Beirut’s emphatic denials, it is inevitable that some of the gas it will receive from Egypt will have originated in Israel. Jonathan Spyer comments:

Lebanese law forbids all contact with Israel and Israelis. Hizballah, which is represented in the caretaker cabinet that currently officially rules Lebanon, is committed to the destruction of Israel. Were it to become apparent that the country’s energy needs were to a considerable extent being met by the import of Israeli gas, these positions might be subject to ridicule.

[Separately], the deal, if implemented, will represent a notable achievement for the Assad regime in its efforts to end its isolation. It will also introduce a situation whereby Hizballah’s leadership will be able to light and heat (or cool) their bunkers in south Beirut (where presumably they’re planning their next war against Israel) courtesy of Israeli extraction of gas from the Eastern Mediterranean.

To add a further layer of absurdity, this is set to take place even as the Hizballah leadership threatens Israel with war if it extracts gas from the neighboring Karish field, [which Hizballah claims lies in Lebanese waters].

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.