Last month, Lebanon, Syria, and Egypt reached an agreement according to which Egypt will pump natural gas through Syria to Lebanon, thus alleviating the last country’s severe energy shortages. Despite Beirut’s emphatic denials, it is inevitable that some of the gas it will receive from Egypt will have originated in Israel. Jonathan Spyer comments:

Lebanese law forbids all contact with Israel and Israelis. Hizballah, which is represented in the caretaker cabinet that currently officially rules Lebanon, is committed to the destruction of Israel. Were it to become apparent that the country’s energy needs were to a considerable extent being met by the import of Israeli gas, these positions might be subject to ridicule.

[Separately], the deal, if implemented, will represent a notable achievement for the Assad regime in its efforts to end its isolation. It will also introduce a situation whereby Hizballah’s leadership will be able to light and heat (or cool) their bunkers in south Beirut (where presumably they’re planning their next war against Israel) courtesy of Israeli extraction of gas from the Eastern Mediterranean.

To add a further layer of absurdity, this is set to take place even as the Hizballah leadership threatens Israel with war if it extracts gas from the neighboring Karish field, [which Hizballah claims lies in Lebanese waters].

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.