Learning from the Success of the Recent Fighting in Gaza

Lasting only 66 hours, the Israeli military operation last weekend was, in Ron Ben-Yishai’s words, “an outright Israeli triumph in all aspects: military, political, and financial.” That this was so, Ben-Yishai explains, is made most clear not by the success of the Iron Dome in intercepting the rockets launched by Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) or the IDF’s swiftness in eliminating the organization’s leadership, but in the terms of the ceasefire:

The PIJ leader Ziyad al-Nakhalah, who is currently in Tehran, as well as the organizations’ other leaders in Gaza and Damascus, had no choice but to accept what the Egyptian mediators’ offer, even though it asked for no significant sacrifice from Israel. The ceasefire lacks any form of substantial political or military content, and does anything but put the organization at ease. It was essentially an unconditional surrender for Islamic Jihad, for the sake of Hamas and Gaza residents.

However, it must be noted that the IDF and civilians were blessed with a lot of luck. A lot of things had the potential to go wrong, yet the odds were in our favor. The missiles fired by our jets landed exactly where they were supposed to, the intelligence was flawless, and the collateral damage, i.e., innocent Gazan civilians, was kept to a minimum. Less than a third of the Palestinian casualties were a result of Israeli fire. This is a noteworthy accomplishment when comparing to previous operations, in which at least half of the casualties were uninvolved civilians. More so, this accomplishment is also noteworthy when compared to armies of other democratic countries.

It must be assumed that the luck we were blessed with this time probably won’t be on our side next time, and that it’s fair to expect that “the next time” is right around the corner. The main takeaway from this operation is that precise political and military preparations are necessary for success in the battlefield. This kind of preparation calls for resources—mostly time—hence the IDF must plan and practice to prepare for operations where we are not the initiators, who always have the upper hand.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza Strip, Islamic Jihad, Israeli Security

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF