President Biden’s visit to Israel and Saudi Arabia last month revived speculation about the possibility of normalization between the two countries, and in fact coincided with important steps in that direction: the opening of Saudi airspace to Israeli planes, the arrival of Israeli journalists in Jeddah directly from Tel Aviv, and the de-facto cooperation over the status of the islands of Tiran and Sanafir. Yet, for those expecting a major announcement about Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords, the result was disappointment. Outlining several factors restraining the kingdom from establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel, Yoel Guzansky suggests what is happening amounts to a “creeping normalization.”

The conclusion drawn from the process so far that led to the Abraham Accords is that given suitable incentive and pressure, the Gulf countries could take steps that deviate from the Arab consensus and from their positions on the Palestinian issue. Therefore, it is possible that Riyadh will advance its relations with Israel regardless of progress on the Israel-Palestinian channel but rather in relation to compensation that it will receive from the United States. And indeed, relations between Washington and Riyadh—and even more so American attention to, and American leadership of, normalization in the Middle East—are of decisive importance.

If the Saudi leadership estimates that rapprochement with Israel will help it strengthen its relations with the United States, improve [its unflattering] image [in the eyes of most Americans], and earn economic and political dividends, it could take another step toward Israel.

The continuation and expansion of the existing normalization agreements are important to the connection between Jerusalem and Saudi Arabia, in part because they are meant to grant legitimacy to their subsequent expansion. . . . A push to advance and highlight the relations and certainly making them an internal Israeli political issue, as occurred surrounding President Biden’s visit to the Middle East, will create unrealistic expectations, increase pressure on the Saudis, and undermine the process.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.