Last month, the Israeli defense minister Benny Gantz visited Japan, where he and his counterparts concluded an agreement concerning security cooperation between the countries. The agreement is an outgrowth of the policies of the late prime minister Shinzo Abe, who cultivated warmer and more robust ties with the Jewish state as part of a more general reorientation of Tokyo’s foreign policy. Eyal Ben-Ari comments:

While bilateral meetings regarding trade have been regularly carried out for the past decade, the defense agreement was a significant boost in terms of cooperation in the national-security area.

The signing of the Abraham Accords, which were the initiative of Benjamin Netanyahu, further expanded the commercial ties between the countries. . . . This development means that today fully 15 percent of all foreign investment in Israeli technology is by Japanese enterprises.

Security ties with Israel are related to the accelerated reinforcement of Japan’s defense capabilities and its more assertive foreign relations during the past decade and a half. The exchange with Israel is especially important given Japan’s strategic considerations in the wake of the war in Ukraine. The war has further accelerated the country’s emphasis on beefing up its security in view of the nuclear threat from North Korea and, more important, an increasingly aggressive China.

The Middle East is crucial, moreover, to Japan’s continued prosperity and economic development, being the site of oil reserves and sitting astride major shipping lanes. . . . Here the interests of Japan and Israel coincide.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.