With another Israeli election approaching in November, recent polling confirms that a growing minority of Ḥaredim are inclined to cast their votes for non-ḥaredi parties. For the most part, this means voting for parties on the political right, especially those associated with Religious Zionists—i.e., non-ḥaredi Orthodox Jews. Efrat Finkel seeks to explain why:

The wandering of votes rightward points to more and more Ḥaredim preferring to identify with “Israeliness” in its rightwing version than sectorial “ḥarediness.” However, contrary to conventional wisdom pegging the ḥaredi rightward tilt to internal ḥaredi processes, I will argue that the right has moved to bring the Ḥaredim closer and increase its identification with them. The ḥaredi rightwing shift is [thus] a consequence of a “Ḥaredization” process that the right has undergone in recent years, much more than an Israelization of the Ḥaredim.

Influenced by these two simultaneous processes, a growing segment of younger Ḥaredim have been increasingly disillusioned with the traditional approach of their political leaders, which is to support whichever major party can offer them more on their core communal issues: funding for schools, avoidance of military service, control of the rabbinate.

Ḥaredi parties have, over time, accumulated the reputation of being “fixers”—promoting politics without values, focused on interests alone, and ready to make every shady deal to achieve them. Ḥaredi MKs are viewed as traditional activists (“makhers”), contrary to the value-based agendas on which other MKs pride themselves. Personally, I think the work of ḥaredi MKs is far broader than [this critique allows, however].

Yet, I believe that in the ḥaredi mindset, voting remains primarily an expression of identity and belonging. This remains true even when the ḥaredi individual no longer casts his vote in favor of a ḥaredi political party—only that the rightwing parties he votes for provide an alternative identity focal point. Thanks to the right moving closer to the Ḥaredim, he feels he can remain devoutly ḥaredi while also being part of the greater Israeli story.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.