Earlier this month, Israel and Lebanon concluded a U.S.-brokered deal to divide up the natural resources in their respective coastal waters. The two parties agreed upon a provisional maritime border that would place all of the Karish offshore gas field in Israeli waters, while placing the bulk of the so-far-unproven Qana field in Lebanese waters. Within the Jewish state, there remains ongoing debate over the agreement’s merits, much of which has become entangled with the upcoming election. Oded Granot addresses some of the criticisms:

The truth of the matter—and Lebanon will concede as much—is that this is a worthy agreement that serves both sides. Those who say that the ten-year dispute could have ended with a better deal [for Israel] are just selling you a lie. . . . The deal, put simply, prevents a conflagration with Hizballah that would have erupted once Israel would begin extracting gas from Karish.

This is not a historic deal and not the first step toward normalization. Lebanese officials have insisted on calling it an arrangement of understanding and have vowed to sign it separately and without meeting Israeli officials at the border crossing. . . . Neither does the deal significantly prevent Israel from getting its fair share of the revenue from the gas deal and provides security for both countries.

There is also an added plus: successful U.S. mediation. The guarantees the Biden administration provided both sides, however toothless, underscore the renewed U.S. presence in the Middle East after it had been long been neglected and handed to Vladimir Putin.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.