Why Israel Isn’t Sending the Iron Dome to Ukraine

Oct. 31 2022

Two weeks ago, Kyiv formally requested that Jerusalem share its missile-defense systems—including the vaunted Iron Dome—citing evidence that Russia plans to use increasing numbers of rockets and drones against the Ukrainian population. Bradley Bowman explains why Israel has thus far declined the request:

In August, Palestinian Islamic Jihad fired some 600 rockets and mortars toward population centers in Israel. But those attacks paled in comparison to what Israel confronted in May 2021. During that conflict, Hamas fired around 4,360 rockets from Gaza toward Israel. In both instances, casualties in Israel would have been significant if it were not for the role of Iron Dome.

Worse still, Hizballah, Tehran’s terror proxy in Lebanon, has about 150,000 surface-to-surface rockets and missiles and an estimated 2,000 unmanned aerial vehicles. Most of the rockets and missiles are relatively rudimentary systems. A small but growing number of them, however, are precision-guided munitions, which are more effective in hitting their desired targets, requiring a greater expenditure of missile interceptors.

That combination of a growing quantity and increasing capability is a genuine nightmare for Israel. Indeed, if Hizballah were to launch an estimated 1,500 rockets and missiles per day, existing Israeli missile defenses could be overwhelmed. Despite efforts to build additional missile-defense capability and capacity, Israel has a long way to go before it has enough missile defenses to deal with a war of this magnitude.

To make matters worse, some in Israel worry Russia could capture an Iron Dome system sent to Ukraine and then provide the system and its information to Iran. Tehran and its terror proxies would undoubtedly then use the information to develop capabilities to circumvent Iron Dome’s defenses, reducing its effectiveness and increasing the ability of Hizballah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad to kill Israelis in future conflicts.

As for those in the U.S. that have criticized Israel for its reticence to send its technology to the Ukrainians, Bowman notes that the “United States itself has not provided the Patriot air- and missile-defense system to Ukraine.”

Read more at Newsweek

More about: Iron Dome, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy, War in Ukraine

Expand Gaza into Sinai

Feb. 11 2025

Calling the proposal to depopulate Gaza completely (if temporarily) “unworkable,” Peter Berkowitz makes the case for a similar, but more feasible, plan:

The United States along with Saudi Arabia and the UAE should persuade Egypt by means of generous financial inducements to open the sparsely populated ten-to-fifteen miles of Sinai adjacent to Gaza to Palestinians seeking a fresh start and better life. Egypt would not absorb Gazans and make them citizens but rather move Gaza’s border . . . westward into Sinai. Fences would be erected along the new border. The Israel Defense Force would maintain border security on the Gaza-extension side, Egyptian forces on the other. Egypt might lease the land to the Palestinians for 75 years.

The Sinai option does not involve forced transfer of civilian populations, which the international laws of war bar. As the United States, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other partners build temporary dwellings and then apartment buildings and towns, they would provide bus service to the Gaza-extension. Palestinian families that choose to make the short trip would receive a key to a new residence and, say, $10,000.

The Sinai option is flawed. . . . Then again, all conventional options for rehabilitating and governing Gaza are terrible.

Read more at RealClear Politics

More about: Donald Trump, Egypt, Gaza Strip, Sinai Peninsula