Why Israel Can’t Risk Sending the Iron Dome to Ukraine

“The U.S.,” writes Jacob Nagel, “is duty-bound to help Ukraine to defeat the brutal invasion of the Russian president Vladimir Putin, [and] Israel must do its utmost to lend a hand.” What neither country should do, the former Israeli national security adviser goes on to argue, is send Kyiv its most advanced missile-defense systems—despite the repeated pleas of Volodymyr Zelensky and members of his government.

The Iron Dome is capable of getting the job done in Ukraine. . . . That being said, there are four reasons why Israel cannot afford to send the Iron Dome and other systems to Ukraine.

The main and most important reason is obvious: it is almost certain that any system provided to Ukraine will ultimately fall into the hands of the Russians and subsequently transferred intact to the Iranians, even if the Ukrainian forces limit their deployment to the Kyiv area (as they have claimed they would in some cases). The know-how and the combat experience will then be used by Iran to develop capabilities that would overcome Iron Dome’s defense and ultimately lower its effectiveness.

The second reason we should not provide such systems is that Israel still doesn’t have enough interceptors for its own operational needs, especially when it comes to countering the threat on the northern border. . . . Third, even if Israel agreed to send weapon systems, it would still take time—presumably, months if not years—before they could be phased into service in Ukraine after the troops get proper training. These three reasons are as valid for the U.S. as they are for Israel.

There is a fourth reason why Israel should not heed Ukraine’s request: the impact on Israel-Russia relations and the dwindling presence of Russia in Syria, as well as the threat of Iran replacing it. While it is less important, this reason should not be overlooked. The war may have led Russia to take troops out of Syria and deploy them in Ukraine. Still, this seemingly positive development has become a source of concern because Iran seeks to fill this vacuum with the backing of Russia and Syria. Having Israel send systems to Ukraine could create a potential threat by Russia, Syria, or Iran to Israel’s freedom of maneuver.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Iron Dome, Israeli Security, U.S. Foreign policy, War in Ukraine

Egypt Is Trapped by the Gaza Dilemma It Helped to Create

Feb. 14 2025

Recent satellite imagery has shown a buildup of Egyptian tanks near the Israeli border, in violation of Egypt-Israel agreements going back to the 1970s. It’s possible Cairo wants to prevent Palestinians from entering the Sinai from Gaza, or perhaps it wants to send a message to the U.S. that it will take all measures necessary to keep that from happening. But there is also a chance, however small, that it could be preparing for something more dangerous. David Wurmser examines President Abdel Fatah el-Sisi’s predicament:

Egypt’s abysmal behavior in allowing its common border with Gaza to be used for the dangerous smuggling of weapons, money, and materiel to Hamas built the problem that exploded on October 7. Hamas could arm only to the level that Egypt enabled it. Once exposed, rather than help Israel fix the problem it enabled, Egypt manufactured tensions with Israel to divert attention from its own culpability.

Now that the Trump administration is threatening to remove the population of Gaza, President Sisi is reaping the consequences of a problem he and his predecessors helped to sow. That, writes Wurmser, leaves him with a dilemma:

On one hand, Egypt fears for its regime’s survival if it accepts Trump’s plan. It would position Cairo as a participant in a second disaster, or nakba. It knows from its own history; King Farouk was overthrown in 1952 in part for his failure to prevent the first nakba in 1948. Any leader who fails to stop a second nakba, let alone participates in it, risks losing legitimacy and being seen as weak. The perception of buckling on the Palestine issue also resulted in the Egyptian president Anwar Sadat’s assassination in 1981. President Sisi risks being seen by his own population as too weak to stand up to Israel or the United States, as not upholding his manliness.

In a worst-case scenario, Wurmser argues, Sisi might decide that he’d rather fight a disastrous war with Israel and blow up his relationship with Washington than display that kind of weakness.

Read more at The Editors

More about: Egypt, Gaza War 2023