Saudi Arabia Is Already Laying the Groundwork for Peace with Israel

In multiple recent public statements, Benjamin Netanyahu—who will be sworn in today as prime minister—has emphasized his hope of securing a normalization agreement with Riyadh, which has been at a formal state of war with the Jewish state since 1948. Chelsi Mueller examines the obstacles to such an agreement and, more importantly, the signs that Riyadh is already laying the groundwork for one:

One indication is the appointment of a cleric, known for having visited Auschwitz and for promoting interfaith dialogue, to an influential role as secretary of the Muslim World League, headquartered in Jeddah. . . . Another indication of the slow preparation for formal peace is the scrubbing of some anti-Semitic content from national school textbooks. Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman’s many public statements have also been used to signal his intent. He reportedly told a group of Jewish leaders in Washington, D.C. that the Palestinians were not a top priority for Saudi Arabia and that his patience with them was running out. . . . Most recently he described Israel as a “potential ally.”

These kinds of statements can serve multiple purposes: they can serve as a trial balloon, a means of gauging the reaction of Saudi citizens; as a sermon about the moderate and pro-American attributes of Saudi foreign policy; as a warning to Iran about the pain that Saudi Arabia could inflict if the Islamic Republic doesn’t modify its behavior; and as a carrot, to remind Israel of the rewards it stands to gain by making certain concessions.

Saudi Arabia continues to reaffirm its support for the “Arab peace plan” in official statements. Saudi Arabia’s proposal was unveiled in 2002 by the late King Abdullah; it offered normalization with Israel in exchange for full withdrawal to the pre-1967 armistice lines, a Palestinian state with eastern Jerusalem as its capital, and a “just” solution for Palestinian refugees. . . . [B]ut there are hints that Saudi Arabia may be flexible about some of its specific stipulations. Recent Saudi statements have been less detailed about thorny issues, such as borders and the return of refugees, suggesting that there may be room for compromise.

Read more at Transatlantic Policy Quarterly

More about: Arab peace initiative, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel-Arab relations, Saudi Arabia

 

Yes, Iran Wanted to Hurt Israel

Surveying news websites and social media on Sunday morning, I immediately found some intelligent and well-informed observers arguing that Iran deliberately warned the U.S. of its pending assault on Israel, and calibrated it so that there would be few casualties and minimal destructiveness, thus hoping to avoid major retaliation. In other words, this massive barrage was a face-saving gesture by the ayatollahs. Others disagreed. Brian Carter and Frederick W. Kagan put the issue to rest:

The Iranian April 13 missile-drone attack on Israel was very likely intended to cause significant damage below the threshold that would trigger a massive Israeli response. The attack was designed to succeed, not to fail. The strike package was modeled on those the Russians have used repeatedly against Ukraine to great effect. The attack caused more limited damage than intended likely because the Iranians underestimated the tremendous advantages Israel has in defending against such strikes compared with Ukraine.

But that isn’t to say that Tehran achieved nothing:

The lessons that Iran will draw from this attack will allow it to build more successful strike packages in the future. The attack probably helped Iran identify the relative strengths and weaknesses of the Israeli air-defense system. Iran will likely also share the lessons it learned in this attack with Russia.

Iran’s ability to penetrate Israeli air defenses with even a small number of large ballistic missiles presents serious security concerns for Israel. The only Iranian missiles that got through hit an Israeli military base, limiting the damage, but a future strike in which several ballistic missiles penetrate Israeli air defenses and hit Tel Aviv or Haifa could cause significant civilian casualties and damage to civilian infrastructure, including ports and energy. . . . Israel and its partners should not emerge from this successful defense with any sense of complacency.

Read more at Institute for the Study of War

More about: Iran, Israeli Security, Missiles, War in Ukraine