While much of the media’s attention is focused on the domestic and constitutional questions currently before the 25th Knesset, there are no shortage of strategic and security-related questions for Israeli leaders to pursue. Jacob Nagel explains how Benjamin Netanyahu and the other members of his coalition ought to approach them:

Israel must prepare for a broad and comprehensive campaign against Iran in the next few years. . . . The new government must do all it can to ensure that Israel will not stand alone in such a confrontation, but it must also prepare for this eventuality.

In parallel, Israel can and should persist with its effort to weaken the Iranian regime. This should include active support for the protests, which may be the first serious opportunity since the fall of the shah to bring down the regime. . . . Economically, Israel can fan the distrust of citizens in the economic and banking system by pointing to official corruption, encouraging withdrawals from the banks, and hastening the ongoing collapse of the [value] of the Iranian rial. In intelligence terms, Israel can release personal information about the senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders and the Basij (IRGC’s domestic militia) operatives who are fighting and killing the protesters, and about anticipated movements of regime forces. Operationally, Israel can disrupt some of the state-sponsored capacities of key Iranian industries, encouraging walkouts, as well as cyberattacks affecting daily activities.

In Gaza, the question is not whether, but when the next major clash will occur. Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad . . . have no interest in bringing quiet to the area, which is bound to undermine their rule in Gaza. The main goal of both the [Israeli] government and the military is to do all that is possible to preserve peace and quiet for the communities living next to the Gaza Strip and to prepare for the next round of battle.

On March 5, Riyadh appointed Salman al-Dosari—a prominent journalist and vocal supporter of the Abraham Accords—as its new minister of information. Hussain Abdul-Hussain takes this choice as one of several signals that Saudi Arabia is inching closer to normalization with Israel:

Saudi Arabia has been the biggest supporter of Palestinians since before the establishment of Israel in 1948. When the kingdom’s founder Abdulaziz Ibn Saud met with the U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt aboard the USS Quincy in the Red Sea in 1945, the Saudi king demanded that Jews in Palestine be settled elsewhere. But unlimited Saudi support has only bought Palestinian ungratefulness and at times, downright hate. After the Abraham Accords were announced in August 2020, Palestinians in Gaza and Ramallah burned pictures not only of the leaders of the UAE and Bahrain but also of Saudi Arabia’s King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MBS).

Since then, many Palestinian pundits and activists have been accusing Saudi Arabia of betraying the cause, even though the Saudis have said repeatedly, and as late as January, that their peace with Israel is incumbent on the establishment of a Palestinian state.

While the Saudi Arabian government has practiced self-restraint by not reciprocating Palestinian hate, Saudi Arabian columnists, cartoonists, and social-media activists have been punching back. After the burning of the pictures of Saudi Arabian leaders, al-Dosari wrote that with their aggression against Saudi Arabia, the Palestinians “have liberated the kingdom from any ethical or political commitment to these parties in the future.”