When Joe Biden came to the White House in 2021, his foreign-policy agenda included restoration of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, who argued against the deal at the time, has returned to office with the goal of finding a more effective way to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet Jonathan Schachter believes current circumstances make it possible for the two leaders to work together:

In the seven years since the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Netanyahu’s warnings have proved prescient. With the agreement’s implementation, Iran became more, not less, aggressive across the Middle East. The nuclear infrastructure the JCPOA guaranteed Iran enabled the regime to move closer to nuclear weapons at a time of its choosing. Rather than preventing proliferation, the JCPOA sparked a regional nuclear-arms race, as Iran’s neighbors now seek the same weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities the agreement allows Iran.

Starting in late summer, the conventional wisdom suggested that nuclear negotiations with Iran were suspended until after the midterm elections. But the regime increasingly continues to violate the JCPOA’s terms irreversibly, while it stonewalls three international investigations into undeclared nuclear materials and activities. A women-led uprising rages in Iran’s streets, despite the regime henchmen’s brutal efforts to put it down. Iran is now giving Russia the same drones and missiles that Tehran has given to Hizballah, the Houthis [in Yemen], and others to menace America’s allies in the Middle East. Providing the Iranian regime with hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and legitimizing the expansion of a uranium enrichment program that has no peaceful justification makes less sense than ever.

The new year opens with a new Israeli government and a historic opportunity for Biden. If . . . he is prepared to pressure rather than placate Iran and to develop a “Plan B” genuinely to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, he will make both a nuclear-arms race and a war to prevent it less likely.

Established in 2012 and maintaining branches in Europe, North America, and Iran, the Samidoun Palestinian Prisoner Network claims its goal is merely to show “solidarity” for imprisoned Palestinians. The organization’s leader, however, has admitted to being a representative of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a notorious terrorist group whose most recent accomplishments include murdering a seventeen-year-old girl. As Arsen Ostrovsky and Patricia Teitelbaum point out, Samidoun is just one example of how the European Union allows Iran-backed terrorists to operate in its midst:

The PFLP is a proxy of the Iranian regime, which provides the terror group with money, training, and weapons. Samidoun . . . has a branch in Tehran. It has even held events there, under the pretext of “cultural activity,” to elicit support for operations in Europe. Its leader, Khaled Barakat, is a regular on Iran’s state [channel] PressTV, calling for violence and lauding Iran’s involvement in the region. It is utterly incomprehensible, therefore, that the EU has not yet designated Samidoun a terror group.

According to the Council of the European Union, groups and/or individuals can be added to the EU terror list on the basis of “proposals submitted by member states based on a decision by a competent authority of a member state or a third country.” In this regard, there is already a standing designation by Israel of Samidoun as a terror group and a decision of a German court finding Barakat to be a senior PFLP operative.

Given the irrefutable axis-of-terror between Samidoun, PFLP, and the Iranian regime, the EU has a duty to put Samidoun and senior Samidoun leaders on the EU terror list. It should do this not as some favor to Israel, but because otherwise it continues to turn a blind eye to a group that presents a clear and present security threat to the European Union and EU citizens.