When Joe Biden came to the White House in 2021, his foreign-policy agenda included restoration of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran. Benjamin Netanyahu, who argued against the deal at the time, has returned to office with the goal of finding a more effective way to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons. Yet Jonathan Schachter believes current circumstances make it possible for the two leaders to work together:

In the seven years since the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal, or Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Netanyahu’s warnings have proved prescient. With the agreement’s implementation, Iran became more, not less, aggressive across the Middle East. The nuclear infrastructure the JCPOA guaranteed Iran enabled the regime to move closer to nuclear weapons at a time of its choosing. Rather than preventing proliferation, the JCPOA sparked a regional nuclear-arms race, as Iran’s neighbors now seek the same weapons-relevant nuclear capabilities the agreement allows Iran.

Starting in late summer, the conventional wisdom suggested that nuclear negotiations with Iran were suspended until after the midterm elections. But the regime increasingly continues to violate the JCPOA’s terms irreversibly, while it stonewalls three international investigations into undeclared nuclear materials and activities. A women-led uprising rages in Iran’s streets, despite the regime henchmen’s brutal efforts to put it down. Iran is now giving Russia the same drones and missiles that Tehran has given to Hizballah, the Houthis [in Yemen], and others to menace America’s allies in the Middle East. Providing the Iranian regime with hundreds of billions of dollars in sanctions relief and legitimizing the expansion of a uranium enrichment program that has no peaceful justification makes less sense than ever.

The new year opens with a new Israeli government and a historic opportunity for Biden. If . . . he is prepared to pressure rather than placate Iran and to develop a “Plan B” genuinely to prevent Tehran from acquiring nuclear weapons, he will make both a nuclear-arms race and a war to prevent it less likely.

The negotiations that secured the release of Edan Alexander were conducted by the U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Adam Boehler, with reportedly little or no involvement from the Israelis. Amit Segal considers:

Does Edan’s release mean foreign-passport holders receive priority over those only with Israeli passports? He is, after all, is a dual American-Israeli citizen who grew up in New Jersey. While it may not be the intended message, many will likely interpret the deal as such: foreign-passport holders are worth more. In a country where many citizens are already obtaining second passports, encouraging even more to do so is unwise, to say the least.

Another bad look for Israel: Washington is freeing Edan, not Jerusalem. . . .

Then there’s the question of the Qatari jumbo jet. At this point we can only speculate, but it’s hard to ignore the fact that as Hamas is set to release a hostage, Trump is also accepting a super luxury jumbo jet from Qatar worth around $400 million. Are the two connected?

Still, Segal reminds us that in one, crucial way, this deal is superior to those that preceded it:

The fact that Hamas appears to be freeing a hostage for nothing in return is indeed a victory. Don’t forget: in February, in exchange for the bodies of four hostages, Israel released over 600 Palestinian prisoners, not to mention the Palestinian terrorists—many of whom have Jewish blood on their hands—released in other deals during this war.

As serious as the concerns Segal and others have raised are, that last point makes me think that some of the handwringing about the deal by other commentators is exaggerated. The coming IDF offensive—tanks have been massing on the edge of Gaza in recent days—the many weeks during which supplies haven’t entered the Strip, and Israel’s declared plans not to allow Hamas the ability to distribute humanitarian aid cannot but have made the jihadists more pliable.

And the deal was made on a schedule set by Israel, which said that it would embark on a full-bore offensive at the end of the week if the hostages aren’t released. Moreover, in the parameters Hamas has set forth until now, Alexander, a male soldier, would have been among the last of the hostages to be exchanged.

What of the claim that President Trump has achieved what Prime Minister Netanyahu couldn’t? Again, there is some truth here. But it’s worth noting that the Hostages Forum—a group representing most of the hostages’ families, consistently critical of Netanyahu, and supported by a broad swath of Israelis—has since at least January been demanding a deal where all the hostages are freed at once. (This demand is an understandable reaction to the sadistic games Hamas played with the weekly releases earlier this year and in the fall of 2023.) So Trump let them down too.

In fact, Trump previously promised that “all hell would break loose” if all hostages weren’t released. Neither has happened, so I’m not sure if Trump looks all that much stronger than Netanyahu.

My takeaway, though, isn’t a defense or criticism of either leader, but simply a cautionary note: let’s not jump to conclusions quite yet.