At present, argue Raphael BenLevi and Michael Doran, the Biden administration’s Middle East policies suffer from two “flawed assumptions,” both of which are holdovers from the Obama White House. One is that an accommodation with Iran is both possible and desirable, the other is that the region “can somehow be quarantined off from the global competition between Washington and Beijing.” They explain, and suggest ways that the U.S. can change course:

Xi Jinping’s [recent] visit to Riyadh should prove to the Biden administration that China is quickly becoming a player in the regional balance of power. Before long, the instability inherent in a Middle East where Tehran dominates will inevitably suck America back into the region and attract China to deepen its strategic engagement.

However, by recalibrating its policies, the Biden administration can limit Chinese involvement in the Middle East while pushing back against Iran. Israel has a key role to play in this strategy, and Israel’s new governing coalition will likely have both the desire and the stability to carry it out.

Israel has evolved from a small state embattled on all sides to a regional power whose unique assets are attracting new partners around the region, as evidenced by the success of the Abraham Accords. Its relationship with the United States should evolve to reflect this new reality.

[For instance], the U.S. should consider moving away from the current model of assistance based on simple foreign military financing, which essentially gives Israel coupons to purchase weapons from American manufacturers. Instead, Washington should move toward a model based on joint military projects. This model already exists on a small scale in the field of missile defense. For the Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Arrow systems, for example, Israel and the United States both contribute financially to development costs and then co-develop, co-produce, and share technology. They could expand this model to include cyber and artificial intelligence. The change would signal the advent of a new phase in their relations, one that recognizes Israel’s position as a partner rather than a client.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.