On February 12, Isaac Herzog—Israel’s current president and a former leader of the Labor party—gave a speech about the ongoing public debate over judicial reform, affirming the legitimacy of both sides’ concerns and urging leaders to find a lasting compromise. Such an intervention was an unusual step in a country where the president is for the most part a figurehead, expected to stay above the political fray, and indeed Herzog did his best to express himself in nonpartisan terms. Haviv Rettig Gur believes the speech had significant effects:

The speech didn’t spark a mad rush to compromise, but the political vocabulary changed instantly. Politicians who’d spent weeks showcasing their partisan bona fides now declared their eagerness for dialogue. . . . Justice Minister Yariv Levin [one of the architects of the proposed reforms], made a point of welcoming dialogue even as he explained why he wouldn’t slow the pace of legislation. . . . Under the public gaze directed his way by the president, he suddenly understood he needed to show he was rational and open to compromise.

On the center-left, the process was much the same. The demand to cancel the plan outright transformed into a demand for a temporary pause—[the opposition leader] Yair Lapid called for a 60-day freeze—to allow for serious negotiations.

There’s a reason Herzog’s speech had that effect, and it points to a surprising new role he has carved out for the Israeli presidency in his twenty months in the position, a role probably unprecedented in Israeli history. . . . One obvious example was his role in the revival of diplomatic ties with Turkey. In March 2022, Herzog traveled to Ankara for a state visit. He was received with unusual warmth by Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, a sharp change in tone from the years when Turkey was the de-facto leader of an anti-Israel, Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated axis in the region.

The visit was first and foremost a calculated geopolitical pivot for both Ankara and Jerusalem. But it was also a result of Herzog’s unexpectedly close ties with the Turkish president, the culmination of a long process of careful relationship-building on Herzog’s part that opened a channel of communication between the two men.

In a momentous meeting with the Syrian president Ahmed al-Sharaa in Riyadh, President Trump announced that he is lifting sanctions on the beleaguered and war-torn country. On the one hand, Sharaa is an alumnus of Islamic State and al-Qaeda, who came to power as commander of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which itself began life as al-Qaeda’s Syrian offshoot; he also seems to enjoy the support of Qatar. On the other hand, he overthrew the Assad regime—a feat made possible by the battering Israel delivered to Hizballah—greatly improving Jerusalem’s strategic position, and ending one of the world’s most atrocious and brutal tyrannies. President Trump also announced that he hopes Syria will join the Abraham Accords.

This analysis by Eran Lerman was published a few days ago, and in some respects is already out of date, but more than anything else I’ve read it helps to make sense of Israel’s strategic position vis-à-vis Syria.

Israel’s primary security interest lies in defending against worst-case scenarios, particularly the potential collapse of the Syrian state or its transformation into an actively hostile force backed by a significant Turkish presence (considering that the Turkish military is the second largest in NATO) with all that this would imply. Hence the need to bolster the new buffer zone—not for territorial gain, but as a vital shield and guarantee against dangerous developments. Continued airstrikes aimed at diminishing the residual components of strategic military capabilities inherited from the Assad regime are essential.

At the same time, there is a need to create conditions that would enable those in Damascus who wish to reject the reduction of their once-proud country into a Turkish satrapy. Sharaa’s efforts to establish his legitimacy, including his visit to Paris and outreach to the U.S., other European nations, and key Gulf countries, may generate positive leverage in this regard. Israel’s role is to demonstrate through daily actions the severe costs of acceding to Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s ambitions and accepting Turkish hegemony.

Israel should also assist those in Syria (and beyond: this may have an effect in Lebanon as well) who look to it as a strategic anchor in the region. The Druze in Syria—backed by their brethren in Israel—have openly expressed this expectation, breaking decades of loyalty to the central power in Damascus over their obligation to their kith and kin.