Among the causes of the recent upswing in terrorism emanating from the West Bank is the decay of Palestinian Authority’s ability to maintain order in the territory under its control. One reason for that, writes Ghaith al-Omari, is a “legitimacy deficit” brought about by a “woeful record on governance and economic issues.” He explains:

According to reputable polling, around 80 percent of Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority (PA) corrupt, and 60 percent see it as a liability rather than an asset. None of its main institutions enjoys popular legitimacy, in part because presidential and legislative elections have not been held since 2005 and 2006, respectively.

The PA leadership has responded by becoming more autocratic, as evidenced by widespread arrests of critics. . . . Indeed, the once-vibrant (though by no means democratic) Fatah movement [of the PA president Mahmoud Abbas] has come to resemble ruling factions in other one-party systems. It is now indistinguishable from the PA, driven largely by patronage, alienated from many of its traditional constituencies, and no longer able effectively to promote discipline within Palestinian communities.

Consequently, the PA’s political and security control over parts of the West Bank has been severely impaired. In Nablus and Jenin, local activists do not feel beholden to the PA leadership, opening space for the emergence of armed groups such as the Lions’ Den and various ad-hoc coalitions. Although Hamas does not control these groups, it has certainly sought to encourage them via financial and political support. Even in Hebron, where the PA’s standing is not as dire, local clans are increasingly seizing a measure of control simply in order to ensure stability.

Al-Omari argues that the U.S., by enlisting the support of the Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Europeans, can and should encourage the PA to reform, and help it do so.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.