Among the causes of the recent upswing in terrorism emanating from the West Bank is the decay of Palestinian Authority’s ability to maintain order in the territory under its control. One reason for that, writes Ghaith al-Omari, is a “legitimacy deficit” brought about by a “woeful record on governance and economic issues.” He explains:

According to reputable polling, around 80 percent of Palestinians consider the Palestinian Authority (PA) corrupt, and 60 percent see it as a liability rather than an asset. None of its main institutions enjoys popular legitimacy, in part because presidential and legislative elections have not been held since 2005 and 2006, respectively.

The PA leadership has responded by becoming more autocratic, as evidenced by widespread arrests of critics. . . . Indeed, the once-vibrant (though by no means democratic) Fatah movement [of the PA president Mahmoud Abbas] has come to resemble ruling factions in other one-party systems. It is now indistinguishable from the PA, driven largely by patronage, alienated from many of its traditional constituencies, and no longer able effectively to promote discipline within Palestinian communities.

Consequently, the PA’s political and security control over parts of the West Bank has been severely impaired. In Nablus and Jenin, local activists do not feel beholden to the PA leadership, opening space for the emergence of armed groups such as the Lions’ Den and various ad-hoc coalitions. Although Hamas does not control these groups, it has certainly sought to encourage them via financial and political support. Even in Hebron, where the PA’s standing is not as dire, local clans are increasingly seizing a measure of control simply in order to ensure stability.

Al-Omari argues that the U.S., by enlisting the support of the Saudis, Jordanians, Egyptians, and Europeans, can and should encourage the PA to reform, and help it do so.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.