In an oft-cited scene in the movie Airplane!, a request for “light” reading is met with a flimsy pamphlet titled “Famous Jewish Sports Legends.” But the truth is that Jews were once heavily represented in certain athletic endeavors, especially boxing in 19th-century England and early 20th-century America. Jewish participation in Major League baseball peaked in the 1930s and then steadily declined—except for a spike in the 1970s. Yet that trend has reversed again, as Elli Wohlgelernter writes:

We are living in the Golden Age of Jewish baseball, and the evidence—as with almost every proof in sports—is in the numbers: sixteen Jews appeared in Major League games last year. And that is the record for one season. . . . [T]he eight Major League seasons with the highest number of Jewish players have occurred since 2009, and the top fifteen since 2006. Irrefutable evidence that the last two decades—fifteen of the past seventeen seasons—have been the most fertile years for Jewish ballplayers.

Jewish fascination with America’s Pastime goes back to the beginning, including keeping tabs on which players were one of ours, [and] continued throughout the 20th century, especially when two Hall of Famers burst on the scene: Hank Greenberg in the years leading up to the Shoah; and Sandy Koufax, who blossomed in the 1960s. Their stories of sitting out Yom Kippur—Greenberg in 1934, Koufax in 1965—is the stuff of legend, quoted over and over and over by Jews and non-Jews alike.

Baseball has also been of service to American Jews. At the turn of the 20th century, new immigrants used the sport to help assimilate into their new homeland. Ironically, the game’s utilitarian purpose then flipped a century later: whereas the immigrant Jew—who mainly came from a religiously knowledgeable home—was using baseball to become American, today’s Americans who play for Team Israel—who come mainly from assimilated homes—are using the game to become more Jewish.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.