In the past few weeks, the fragile political compromise that has held Sudan together since the ouster of the Islamist dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019 has come apart, leading to fighting between rival factions that has left hundreds dead. The current conflict pits the head of the military and de-facto ruler Abdul Fattah al-Burhan against the forces of Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti. Monday, the press reported that Jerusalem has reached out to both sides to offer to mediate. Ehud Yaari provides a history of Israel’s relations with Sudan from the 1950s to the present, and considers how the current situation might affect the country’s accession to the Abraham Accords in 2020:

During the current normalization era, Israeli authorities have failed to cultivate relations with Sudanese civilian parties, focusing entirely on Burhan, his subordinate officers, and to a lesser extent the RSF, [Hemedti’s militia]. For three successive governments in Jerusalem, no serious effort was undertaken to show the Sudanese people the potential benefits of normalization. A lone attempt to establish a “Sudan-Israel Friendship Association” in Khartoum quickly faded away, and humanitarian aid sent by an Israeli NGO did not receive any publicity.

The two-and-a-half-year delay in converting the normalization declaration into a signed peace agreement appears to have put the entire process at risk. Even if Sudan forms a civilian government in the near term, it may prove reluctant to test the public mood by concluding a treaty with the “Zionist enemy,” as Israel is often referred to by the local press, social-media commentators, and politicians. If Burhan wins his contest with Hemedti, his Islamist allies may convince him to suspend or at least slow down normalization; similarly, if Hemedti prevails, he will have to factor in how [his] potential partners feel about Israel.

Keeping Sudan in the Abraham Accords may therefore require the United States to insist that Khartoum fulfill its commitments and complete the peace agreement—perhaps even by warning the country that it stands to lose the U.S. benefits granted in conjunction with the initial normalization declaration. Most of Sudan’s civilian factions do not want to forfeit American support.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.