On Sunday, the IDF downed what appears to have been a drone that entered Israeli airspace from Syria. In the days beforehand, Israel reportedly carried out a particularly intense series of strikes on Iran-linked military positions in Syria. Yoav Limor puts these events in their wider context:

The shadow war between Israel and Iran has been ongoing for many years. However, it seems Iran has been increasing its pressure to act lately. This is demonstrated in almost every possible area: by its efforts to smuggle weapons into Syria and Lebanon; the attempt to harm Israelis and Jews in Athens (which was thwarted by a joint operation between the Mossad and the Greek security forces); by direct and indirect aid to Palestinian terror organizations; and by increasing activity in the northern arena—especially via Hizballah, which crossed a dangerous red line by apparently sending a terrorist from Lebanon to Israel to carry out an attack at the Megiddo Junction.

Those in the Israeli security forces think that this [upsurge in activity] results from Iran’s assumption that Israel is preoccupied with its internal problems (in light of the crisis caused by the judicial reform) and that Israel can now be challenged more than in the past. This premise is incorrect twofold: Israel’s security apparatus continues to operate as before to thwart terror activity, and an external crisis will actually unite Israeli society.

Therefore, Israel now wants to make clear to Hizballah and its Iranian benefactors that they are playing with fire. The two alleged Israeli strikes on Syria on Wednesday night and Thursday night will likely convey this exact message. Their target was Iranian weapons and infrastructure, and in the second attack, a senior Iranian Revolutionary Guard operative, Milad Heydari, was killed. . . . Another five Iranian operatives were killed along with him.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.