On April 6, over 30 rockets were launched from southern Lebanon into Israel, injuring three and prompting a response by the IDF. While it seems most likely that Hamas carried out the barrage—the largest from Lebanon since the 2006 war—it could only have done so with the permission of Hizballah, the Iran-sponsored militia that controls the area. Oved Lobel argues that this attack is not an extension of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, but of the Iran-Israel one:

Once again, as it did in 2021, [Tehran’s] integrated network known as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) chose to piggyback on tensions and provocations in Jerusalem to launch salvoes of rockets at Israel from Lebanon, Gaza, and Syria. . . . This is far from the first time the Palestinian fronts of the IRGC’s “resistance axis” have fired rockets from Lebanon, hence Israel striking Palestinian bases there in 2013 and 2019. Rockets were also launched, likely by Palestinians, in 2009 from Lebanon.

Both Hamas and the Iranian regime consider the Palestinian terrorist group to be a constitutive element of the IRGC’s regional jihad to destroy Israel. . . . As if to underline the point, the rockets last week were launched while the Hamas politburo leader Ismail Haniyeh, leading a senior Hamas delegation, was meeting with Hizballah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah in Beirut to “coordinate positions and strengthen the resistance against the Israeli enemy.”

It is very important not to fall for the IRGC’s shell game. All of these ostensibly separate organizations, Palestinian or otherwise, are both materially and, in almost all cases—though not necessarily in the case of Hamas—ideologically beholden to Iran’s supreme leader and the IRGC.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.