Did German Generals Save the Jews of Palestine during World War I?

In the summer of 1916, after the costly failure of his assault on the French at the battle of Verdun, General Erich von Falkenhayn was removed from his position as chief of staff of the German army. His dismissal did not spell the end of his military career, however: he was dispatched first to Romania and from there to the Middle East, where he was to lead a large Ottoman force to prevent the British from seizing Palestine. (Even before World War I, the Ottoman army had become largely dependent on German military advisers.) There, along with his subordinate Kress von Kressenstein, it seems that Falkenhayn saved the Jews of the Land of Israel from a fate similar to that of the Armenians. Lenny Ben-David examines the evidence:

The Turkish governor of Syria and Palestine, Jamal Pasha, . . . was a ruthless ruler and one of the “Young Turk” leaders accused of carrying out the expulsion and massacre of hundreds of thousands of Armenians across the Ottoman-controlled regions during World War I.

Zionists were particularly suspected of leading opposition to Ottoman rule, and leaders—such as David Ben-Gurion—were arrested, harassed, or exiled. Many were relative newcomers from Russia, an enemy state. Meanwhile, over the horizon, 1,000 Jewish volunteers for the British army, including some from Palestine, formed the Zion Mule Corps in 1915, later known as the Jewish Legion. . . . Jamal was reportedly furious, and his fury turned murderous when a Jewish spy cell aiding the British, “NILI,” was discovered in the Jewish town of Zichron Yaakov in 1917.

Jamal sought to expel the Jews of Jerusalem and beyond. Expulsions of Jews from Jaffa and Tel Aviv areas had already taken place in late 1914 and again in early 1917.

Early on, Kress opposed Jamal’s genocidal intentions. When Falkenhayn arrived in Palestine in 1917, he also argued against Jamal Pasha’s plans. Both appealed to their political leaders in Germany, even the emperor of Germany. . . . Several accounts confirm that German officers and diplomats protected the Jews.

Read more at Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs

More about: Anti-Semitism, Ottoman Palestine, World War I, Zion Mule Corps

What Kind of Deal Did the U.S. Make with Hamas?

The negotiations that secured the release of Edan Alexander were conducted by the U.S. envoys Steve Witkoff and Adam Boehler, with reportedly little or no involvement from the Israelis. Amit Segal considers:

Does Edan’s release mean foreign-passport holders receive priority over those only with Israeli passports? He is, after all, is a dual American-Israeli citizen who grew up in New Jersey. While it may not be the intended message, many will likely interpret the deal as such: foreign-passport holders are worth more. In a country where many citizens are already obtaining second passports, encouraging even more to do so is unwise, to say the least.

Another bad look for Israel: Washington is freeing Edan, not Jerusalem. . . .

Then there’s the question of the Qatari jumbo jet. At this point we can only speculate, but it’s hard to ignore the fact that as Hamas is set to release a hostage, Trump is also accepting a super luxury jumbo jet from Qatar worth around $400 million. Are the two connected?

Still, Segal reminds us that in one, crucial way, this deal is superior to those that preceded it:

The fact that Hamas appears to be freeing a hostage for nothing in return is indeed a victory. Don’t forget: in February, in exchange for the bodies of four hostages, Israel released over 600 Palestinian prisoners, not to mention the Palestinian terrorists—many of whom have Jewish blood on their hands—released in other deals during this war.

As serious as the concerns Segal and others have raised are, that last point makes me think that some of the handwringing about the deal by other commentators is exaggerated. The coming IDF offensive—tanks have been massing on the edge of Gaza in recent days—the many weeks during which supplies haven’t entered the Strip, and Israel’s declared plans not to allow Hamas the ability to distribute humanitarian aid cannot but have made the jihadists more pliable.

And the deal was made on a schedule set by Israel, which said that it would embark on a full-bore offensive at the end of the week if the hostages aren’t released. Moreover, in the parameters Hamas has set forth until now, Alexander, a male soldier, would have been among the last of the hostages to be exchanged.

What of the claim that President Trump has achieved what Prime Minister Netanyahu couldn’t? Again, there is some truth here. But it’s worth noting that the Hostages Forum—a group representing most of the hostages’ families, consistently critical of Netanyahu, and supported by a broad swath of Israelis—has since at least January been demanding a deal where all the hostages are freed at once. (This demand is an understandable reaction to the sadistic games Hamas played with the weekly releases earlier this year and in the fall of 2023.) So Trump let them down too.

In fact, Trump previously promised that “all hell would break loose” if all hostages weren’t released. Neither has happened, so I’m not sure if Trump looks all that much stronger than Netanyahu.

My takeaway, though, isn’t a defense or criticism of either leader, but simply a cautionary note: let’s not jump to conclusions quite yet.

Read more at Amit Segal

More about: Benjamin Netanyahu, Donald Trump, Hamas, U.S.-Israel relationship