Last month, fighting broke out in Sudan between the militia of the former warlord Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as Hemedti) and the country’s army, led by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. Russia, eager to expand its influence in Africa, is supporting both sides, while China too could use the conflict to develop its own presence in the region. Zineb Riboua explains the American interest in restoring order, and what Washington can do:

A civil war risks not just disrupting the regional economy but also turning Sudan back into a haven for terrorists. From there, terrorists could undermine efforts currently underway to stabilize the Sahel region, [the band of grassland just south of the Sahara, which stretches from Senegal to Eritrea]. And they could threaten more distant areas: it’s worth remembering that Osama bin Laden, before being expelled in 1996, spent five years in Sudan developing the terrorist organization with global reach that perpetrated the 9/11 attacks.

A primary strategic goal of the United States is to reduce the size of [Russia’s] foothold and, if possible, eliminate it. That will be no mean task, but the Biden team has partners who can help. Like the Russians, the Israelis also engage with both Burhan and Hemedti. Jerusalem seeks to retain Sudan as a signatory to the historic Abraham Accords. In Sudan, as with so many other issues these days, Saudi and Israeli interests align. Like Jerusalem, Riyadh has also avoided the temptation to pick a winner.

If the U.S. president Joe Biden places the Saudi-brokered talks between Burhan and Hemedti in the correct strategic frame, he will see them as one means to help bring the United States’ Middle Eastern partners, including Israel, closer together. The talks can serve as a tool not just to stabilize the Red Sea region but to deny it to Russia and China.

China, Russia, and Iran seek to undermine the U.S.-led order globally. The only way to elevate Washington’s status in the Red Sea is by directly working with allies who can, in this case, negotiate a cease-fire between Hemedti and Burhan. Therein lies the true opportunity: to restore relations with Arab allies and to develop the Abraham Accords into a strategic instrument in the competition with Moscow and Beijing.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.