Israel Risks Losing Its Deterrence over Hizballah

Since its 2006 war with Hizballah, the Jewish state has been able to maintain relative calm on its northern border. The IDF has for the most part refrained from attacking the Iran-backed terrorist group in its South Lebanon stronghold, where it has an arsenal of some 120,000 rockets, while Hizballah has been reluctant to retaliate when the IDF strikes its positions in Syria. But Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer fear that the Shiite militia has been gradually eroding this uncomfortable status quo:

Hizballah can boast of several accomplishments over the past two years, including its claim that its own activities have forced Israel to scale back its operations in Lebanon’s airspace; the expanded presence of Hizballah operatives along the border with Israel in observation posts (which were constructed under the guise of Green Without Borders, a Lebanese environmental NGO); skirmishes with Israeli forces along the borders; and the self-confidence that [its leader Hassan] Nasrallah has demonstrated since the maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed in October 2022, which Nasrallah claims as a victory for Hizballah thanks to its threats against Israel.

In addition, Hizballah—like the other members of the [pro-Iran] axis—sees the internal Israeli dispute over [judicial reform] and the widespread protests against the Israeli government as an expression of Israel’s inherent weakness and mistakenly interprets this as a significant blow to its military strength. The false narrative that Nasrallah has spun, especially over the past twelve months and that has come to the fore in his speeches, is, it seems, the reason for the excessive daring that he has displayed during recent events.

Read more at Institute for National Security Studies

More about: Hizballah, Israeli Security, Lebanon

 

American Middle East Policy Should Focus Less on Stability and More on Weakening Enemies

Feb. 10 2025

To Elliott Abrams, Donald Trump’s plan to remove the entire population of Gaza while the Strip is rebuilt is “unworkable,” at least “as a concrete proposal.” But it is welcome insofar as “its sheer iconoclasm might lead to a healthy rethinking of U.S. strategy and perhaps of Arab and Israeli policies as well.” The U.S., writes Abrams, must not only move beyond the failed approach to Gaza, but also must reject other assumptions that have failed time and again. One is the commitment to an illusory stability:

For two decades, what American policymakers have called “stability” has meant the preservation of the situation in which Gaza was entirely under Hamas control, Hizballah dominated Lebanon, and Iran’s nuclear program advanced. A better term for that situation would have been “erosion,” as U.S. influence steadily slipped away and Washington’s allies became less secure. Now, the United States has a chance to stop that process and aim instead for “reinforcement”: bolstering its interests and allies and actively weakening its adversaries. The result would be a region where threats diminish and U.S. alliances grow stronger.

Such an approach must be applied above all to the greatest threat in today’s Middle East, that of a nuclear Iran:

Trump clearly remains open to the possibility (however small) that an aging [Iranian supreme leader Ali] Khamenei, after witnessing the collapse of [his regional proxies], mulling the possibility of brutal economic sanctions, and being fully aware of the restiveness of his own population, would accept an agreement that stops the nuclear-weapons program and halts payments and arms shipments to Iran’s proxies. But Trump should be equally aware of the trap Khamenei might be setting for him: a phony new negotiation meant to ensnare Washington in talks for years, with Tehran’s negotiators leading Trump on with the mirage of a successful deal and a Nobel Peace Prize at the end of the road while the Iranian nuclear-weapons program grows in the shadows.

Read more at Foreign Affairs

More about: Iran, Middle East, U.S. Foreign policy