Since its 2006 war with Hizballah, the Jewish state has been able to maintain relative calm on its northern border. The IDF has for the most part refrained from attacking the Iran-backed terrorist group in its South Lebanon stronghold, where it has an arsenal of some 120,000 rockets, while Hizballah has been reluctant to retaliate when the IDF strikes its positions in Syria. But Orna Mizrahi and Yoram Schweitzer fear that the Shiite militia has been gradually eroding this uncomfortable status quo:

Hizballah can boast of several accomplishments over the past two years, including its claim that its own activities have forced Israel to scale back its operations in Lebanon’s airspace; the expanded presence of Hizballah operatives along the border with Israel in observation posts (which were constructed under the guise of Green Without Borders, a Lebanese environmental NGO); skirmishes with Israeli forces along the borders; and the self-confidence that [its leader Hassan] Nasrallah has demonstrated since the maritime border agreement between Israel and Lebanon was signed in October 2022, which Nasrallah claims as a victory for Hizballah thanks to its threats against Israel.

In addition, Hizballah—like the other members of the [pro-Iran] axis—sees the internal Israeli dispute over [judicial reform] and the widespread protests against the Israeli government as an expression of Israel’s inherent weakness and mistakenly interprets this as a significant blow to its military strength. The false narrative that Nasrallah has spun, especially over the past twelve months and that has come to the fore in his speeches, is, it seems, the reason for the excessive daring that he has displayed during recent events.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”