Israel’s Campaign in Gaza Has Been a Success, but Won’t Achieve a Decisive Victory

Since Israel launched Operation Shield and Arrow on Tuesday, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) has fired over 800 rockets into the southern and central parts of the country—killing at least one, wounding several, and causing extensive damage. The IDF undertook the operation after the Iran-backed organization launched a barrage of 102 rockets at Israeli towns and villages last week. Thus far, Jerusalem has killed at least three senior PIJ commanders and destroyed numerous rocket-launching facilities. Yoav Limor takes stock, and draws some conclusions:

First: while Israel should not be itching for a fight in Gaza, it doesn’t need to shy away from it, especially when a small and brazen organization like PIJ is the provocateur. The organization has tried to create linkage between Judea and Samaria, on the one hand, and the Gaza Strip on the other, so that any deadly Israeli raid against terrorists in the West Bank would automatically lead to rocket fire from the Gaza Strip. Israel has now put a big flashing sign over that idea, sending the message that if it does not disabuse itself of that idea it will have to pay a price.

[Another] conclusion is that despite its inflammatory rhetoric, Hamas seeks to avoid a confrontation at present. To be more precise: it doesn’t want to be dragged into one by PIJ. Hamas, if and when it decides to enter the fray, will do it for its own reasons and at an opportune moment. This could happen sooner than we think—perhaps in response to the upcoming flag march to celebrate Jerusalem’s reunification next week. . . . If Israel acts wisely, . . . Hamas will prefer to keep things calm in the Gaza Strip and to continue building up its capabilities rather than be consumed by warfare.

[Finally], the overall fundamentals will not have changed even after the operation is over. Those on the Israeli side who gloated that we have managed to change the equation are advised to think again: this is the third time in three years that Israel has carried out this type of operation against PIJ. This means that any deterrent effect is short-lived and needs routine maintenance.

Read more at Israel Hayom

More about: Gaza Strip, Hamas, Israeli Security, Palestinian Islamic Jihad

What a Strategic Victory in Gaza Can and Can’t Achieve

On Tuesday, the Israeli defense minister Yoav Gallant met in Washington with Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin. Gallant says that he told the former that only “a decisive victory will bring this war to an end.” Shay Shabtai tries to outline what exactly this would entail, arguing that the IDF can and must attain a “strategic” victory, as opposed to merely a tactical or operational one. Yet even after a such a victory Israelis can’t expect to start beating their rifles into plowshares:

Strategic victory is the removal of the enemy’s ability to pose a military threat in the operational arena for many years to come. . . . This means the Israeli military will continue to fight guerrilla and terrorist operatives in the Strip alongside extensive activity by a local civilian government with an effective police force and international and regional economic and civil backing. This should lead in the coming years to the stabilization of the Gaza Strip without Hamas control over it.

In such a scenario, it will be possible to ensure relative quiet for a decade or more. However, it will not be possible to ensure quiet beyond that, since the absence of a fundamental change in the situation on the ground is likely to lead to a long-term erosion of security quiet and the re-creation of challenges to Israel. This is what happened in the West Bank after a decade of relative quiet, and in relatively stable Iraq after the withdrawal of the United States at the end of 2011.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, IDF