With national elections coming in less than two weeks, Recep Tayyip Erdogan faces perhaps the most serious electoral threat of his career as Turkey’s president. Although Erdogan’s hostility toward Israel has contributed to the decline in relations between the two countries, there is little reason to believe his successor will be any better. A new government might even set back the tenuous reconciliation between the two countries. Hay Eytan Cohen Yanarocak writes:

The leader of the secular Republican People’s Party (CHP), Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, has managed to coalesce the six opposition parties and form the National Alliance. The various elements of the bloc have deep ideological divisions. . . . This is perhaps the “Anyone but Erdogan” coalition.

You could be forgiven for thinking Erdogan’s potential downfall would be good for Israel. But with the National Alliance including figures like former Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu and Temel Karamollaoğlu, the head of the . . . main Islamic opposition party, it would be premature to say that the president’s departure would usher in improved ties between Jerusalem and Ankara. Davutoğlu has been fiercely opposed to the normalization with Israel and Karamollaoğlu wants to sever bilateral relations altogether.

In any event, a new Turkish leadership will not create a golden age for Turkey-Israel relations in the near term. In fact, the opposite may be true: Kılıçdaroğlu could try to rally his fragile coalition by burnishing his anti-Israel credentials. There are signs this is already happening. . . . Israel must be extra careful in its handling of the unpredictable new-old political players.

On Tuesday, a Hizballah drone attack injured three people in northern Israel. The next day, another attack, targeting an IDF base, injured eighteen people, six of them seriously, in Arab al-Amshe, also in the north. This second attack involved the simultaneous use of drones carrying explosives and guided antitank missiles. In both cases, the defensive systems that performed so successfully last weekend failed to stop the drones and missiles. Ron Ben-Yishai has a straightforward explanation as to why: the Lebanon-backed terrorist group is getting better at evading Israel defenses. He explains the three basis systems used to pilot these unmanned aircraft, and their practical effects:

These systems allow drones to act similarly to fighter jets, using “dead zones”—areas not visible to radar or other optical detection—to approach targets. They fly low initially, then ascend just before crashing and detonating on the target. The terrain of southern Lebanon is particularly conducive to such attacks.

But this requires skills that the terror group has honed over months of fighting against Israel. The latest attacks involved a large drone capable of carrying over 50 kg (110 lbs.) of explosives. The terrorists have likely analyzed Israel’s alert and interception systems, recognizing that shooting down their drones requires early detection to allow sufficient time for launching interceptors.

The IDF tries to detect any incoming drones on its radar, as it had done prior to the war. Despite Hizballah’s learning curve, the IDF’s technological edge offers an advantage. However, the military must recognize that any measure it takes is quickly observed and analyzed, and even the most effective defenses can be incomplete. The terrain near the Lebanon-Israel border continues to pose a challenge, necessitating technological solutions and significant financial investment.