At the age eighty-seven and reportedly in declining health, the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas has not yet named a successor. As he has held his position for eighteen years, and no elections have been held since 2005, there is no functioning mechanism to replace him if he were to leave office. The PA meanwhile suffers from declining legitimacy and is losing its hold over parts of the West Bank. Ghaith al-Omari warns that Abbas’s death could lead to violence that might well draw in Israel and destabilize Jordan, and considers what might be done to prevent such an outcome:

The PA, like the Arab governments it modeled itself on, was never democratic. Yet starting with attempts to deny Hamas the ability to govern after its 2007 parliamentary victory, Abbas abandoned all remaining checks and balances in favor of concentrating power in his hands. . . . Although this approach has brought Fatah, [the PA’s ruling faction of which he is the head], firmly under his control, the party’s base has narrowed and its appeal to young politically minded Palestinians has diminished. Abbas has dealt swiftly with party figures who have attempted to build a political base or who have become too popular.

A stable succession cannot be ensured once the process is in full swing. In the heat of the moment, the stakes will be too high for the competitors to be expected to cooperate. The process must begin now, while Abbas is still strong enough to shape it. He does not need to choose a successor. Instead, he need only create the process and rules for identifying and selecting capable leaders.

Expecting such a process to be fully democratic may be a step too far, given the split between Fatah and Hamas and the increasingly fragmented nature of Palestinian politics. But revitalizing Fatah’s ability to produce credible leaders could at least stabilize the succession process. This will mean readmitting expelled or alienated leaders to Fatah and allowing for open competition within the movement.

Abbas is unlikely to take those steps himself, which would run contrary to his leadership style. It should instead be established by the United States, which remains the only international actor with enough diplomatic heft to assemble a coalition of European and regional leaders capable of applying concerted pressure on Abbas. Although Washington should kickstart and lead this process, it should not oversee it directly. The United States should instead work in partnership with its Arab allies, who understand Palestinian politics and know all the players.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.