On Tuesday, Khader Adnan, a senior member of Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) awaiting trial in an Israeli jail, succeeded in starving himself to death. Islamic Jihad, with the consent of Hamas, responded by firing some 100 rockets into southwestern Israel. After the IDF carried out retaliatory airstrikes, Egypt brokered a ceasefire, which went into effect on Wednesday morning. Ron Ben-Yishai takes stock:

Hamas . . . seeks to continue to enjoy the income from Gazans working in Israel and funds from Qatar while appearing to its people as an active partner in the Palestinian resistance. But why did Israel not respond more forcefully to over 100 rockets and why is the all-right-wing government doing nothing to restore deterrence along the border?

One possible explanation is that the current focus of the military is on the West Bank and the possible violence that could erupt in the wake of Khader Adnan [dying] in jail. Sooner or later [Israel] will have to launch a major operation in Jenin and Nablus to dissuade, at least temporarily, terror groups from action there. Another explanation is that Israel opted to end the latest cycle fearing the lack of international backing for an Israeli offensive after a prisoner died while in its custody.

The U.S. has been indicating to Jerusalem that it hopes for calm on the Palestinian front, especially in the West Bank, and a major Israeli operation in Gaza or even a significant bombing campaign there would help Palestinians drag Israel to the UN Security Council for condemnations supported by Russia, China, and perhaps even the U.S. Israel would also be required to call up reserve units and keep residents in the south in shelters, while the recent rockets caused little damage to the home front.

Israel’s only substantive gain this time around is that it did not succumb to Adnan’s demands that he be released due to his hunger strike, and [thus] may not be coerced by others in the future.

Early Friday morning, Israel attacked military installations near the Iranian cities of Isfahan and nearby Natanz, the latter being one of the hubs of the country’s nuclear program. Jerusalem is not taking credit for the attack, and none of the details are too certain, but it seems that the attack involved multiple drones, likely launched from within Iran, as well as one or more missiles fired from Syrian or Iraqi airspace. Strikes on Syrian radar systems shortly beforehand probably helped make the attack possible, and there were reportedly strikes on Iraq as well.

Iran itself is downplaying the attack, but the S-300 air-defense batteries in Isfahan appear to have been destroyed or damaged. This is a sophisticated Russian-made system positioned to protect the Natanz nuclear installation. In other words, Israel has demonstrated that Iran’s best technology can’t protect the country’s skies from the IDF. As Yossi Kuperwasser puts it, the attack, combined with the response to the assault on April 13,

clarified to the Iranians that whereas we [Israelis] are not as vulnerable as they thought, they are more vulnerable than they thought. They have difficulty hitting us, but we have no difficulty hitting them.

Nobody knows exactly how the operation was carried out. . . . It is good that a question mark hovers over . . . what exactly Israel did. Let’s keep them wondering. It is good for deniability and good for keeping the enemy uncertain.

The fact that we chose targets that were in the vicinity of a major nuclear facility but were linked to the Iranian missile and air forces was a good message. It communicated that we can reach other targets as well but, as we don’t want escalation, we chose targets nearby that were involved in the attack against Israel. I think it sends the message that if we want to, we can send a stronger message. Israel is not seeking escalation at the moment.