The Lessons of Israeli-Egyptian Peace for the Caucasus

Last month, the U.S. hosted talks between Armenia and Azerbaijan, two countries that have been in a formal state of war since before they officially gained independence from the USSR. The talks were then continued under EU auspices in Moldova. Resolving this conflict could have important ramifications for Israel, Iran, the U.S., and Russia. To Gerald Steinberg, Baku and Yerevan—as well as the American mediators—could learn some useful lessons from the Egypt-Israel negotiations of the 1970s:

In both conflicts, the exploration of the potential for a negotiated resolution that satisfies the vital interests of the two parties followed a series of very costly wars and, in the language of conflict management, “a mutually hurting stalemate.” For Israel and Egypt, exhaustion after the bitter war of 1973 (following earlier clashes in 1948, 1956, and 1967), led both countries to cooperate with the U.S. secretary of state Henry Kissinger in the first direct talks between officials from Cairo and Jerusalem. These talks produced two disengagement agreements that opened the door for broader peace negotiations.

In 2020, the 44-day war between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which followed over 30 years of conflict, ended with Baku recapturing much of the Karabakh region following a successful campaign based on heavy use of drones and other advanced technology. However, the ceasefire lines left the countries dependent on one another for access to areas where citizens from the other side continue to live. . . . In many ways, this is similar to the Egyptian-Israeli status quo after the ceasefire and disengagement agreements.

The circumstances for Azerbaijan and Armenia are different, but the leaders will need to watch the American and European mediation efforts for agendas that divert the focus from the shared objectives. And like the Soviet Union 40 years ago, Russia under Putin can be expected to act as a spoiler, using force and threats to maintain influence.

Russia continues to be directly involved in supporting and arming Armenia, including maintaining bases in its territory and moving invisible arms shipments overland from Iran through this area. However, Russia’s power has been reduced by the morass in Ukraine and the failures of its weapons in the 2020 conflict with Azerbaijan, giving [Armenia’s] Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan room to maneuver.

Read more at BESA Center

More about: Armenians, Azerbaijan, Camp David Accords, Russia, U.S. Foreign policy

The Hard Truth about Deradicalization in Gaza

Sept. 13 2024

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.

Read more at European Conservative

More about: Gaza War 2023, World War II