Exhibit A of how Qatar’s propaganda operations infiltrate American media is the far-left, fanatically anti-Israel, Anglo-American television commentator Mehdi Hasan, who began his career at Al Jazeera and in 2020 became host of a show on MSNBC. When the network canceled it in late November, Hasan and his defenders complained loudly of the “silencing” of criticism of Israel and, of course, Islamophobia. In fact, as Christine Rosen explains, market forces drove him off the air:

As the Washington Post reported, Hasan’s show “regularly came in third place among the 25-to-54 demographic most valued by advertisers and averaged just 532,000 total viewers in October.” Those ratings got even worse after the horrific October 7 attack on Israel by Hamas. As the New York Post reported, total viewers for MSNBC declined “24 percent for the four days between October 7 and 10, compared to the same period the previous week,” while viewership rose steeply for Fox News and somewhat for CNN during the same period.

This is perhaps because MSNBC hosts like Hasan refused to refer to Hamas killers as terrorists, preferring to call them “fighters” instead. They uncritically reported the Gaza Health Ministry’s false, inflated death tolls for Palestinians. And, in Hasan’s case, they frequently blamed Israel and its policies for the horrific attack on Israeli civilians—even going so far as to compare Israel’s response to Hamas to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. These are all extremist views not shared by the vast majority of Americans.

And that’s a good thing.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.