While Hamas watches international institutions accuse Israel of imaginary war crimes and world opinion condemn Israel for a successful strike on Hamas operatives, some of its spokesmen are suggesting that it is considering moderating its goals. Neomi Neumann and Matthew Levitt explain that such rhetoric is entirely disingenuous:

Within a month of the [October 7] attack, the Hamas Shura Council member Khalil al-Hayya . . . floated the idea of a truce with Israel that could last five years or more based on the pre-1967 ceasefire lines, envisioning a unified Palestinian government that includes Hamas and governs both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Last month, the senior Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh proposed restructuring the PLO to include all Palestinian factions.

Yet, Neumann and Levitt argue, these statements don’t really contradict other statements by Hamas leaders that it will “repeat the October 7 attacks, time and again, until Israel is annihilated.”

Hamas has a long history of hinting at moderation as a means of gaining international support so it can continue “resistance” through political means.

Hamas was and will remain a “liberation” movement with a cohesive identity, which includes a national component that defines its goal (a state) and a religious component that defines both its borders (“between the river and the sea”) and character (Islamist). . . . Hamas’s post-October 7 situation will not change its policy, which is a function of the group’s fundamental identity and purpose and thus inflexible. Hamas’s statements about a Palestinian state are an attempt to demonstrate pragmatism without changing its basic conceptual framework.

With the IDF engaged in ground maneuvers in both northern and southern Gaza, and a plan about to go into effect next week that would separate more than 100,000 civilians from Hamas’s control, an end to the war may at last be in sight. Yet there seems to be no agreement within Israel, or without, about what should become of the territory. Efraim Inbar assesses the various proposals, from Donald Trump’s plan to remove the population entirely, to the Israeli far-right’s desire to settle the Strip with Jews, to the internationally supported proposal to place Gaza under the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA)—and exposes the fatal flaws of each. He therefore tries to reframe the problem:

[M]any Arab states have failed to establish a monopoly on the use of force within their borders. Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, Libya, and Sudan all suffer from civil wars or armed militias that do not obey the central government.

Perhaps Israel needs to get used to the idea that in the absence of an entity willing to take Gaza under its wing, chaos will prevail there. This is less terrible than people may think. Chaos would allow Israel to establish buffer zones along the Gaza border without interference. Any entity controlling Gaza would oppose such measures and would resist necessary Israeli measures to reduce terrorism. Chaos may also encourage emigration.

Israel is doomed to live with bad neighbors for the foreseeable future. There is no way to ensure zero terrorism. Israel should avoid adopting a policy of containment and should constantly “mow the grass” to minimize the chances of a major threat emerging across the border. Periodic conflicts may be necessary. If the Jews want a state in their homeland, they need to internalize that Israel will have to live by the sword for many more years.