On May 11, the UN General Assembly voted by a margin of 143 to nine to give Palestine de-facto status as a member state. A number of European countries have also recognized a state of Palestine. But, Elliott Abrams observes, such formal recognition does not create such a state:

In the case of “Palestine,” the more people believe that it exists and must be recognized immediately, the less likely it is that a real “state of Palestine” will ever come into existence. Why? Because the chances that the prerequisites for the creation of an independent, sovereign, peaceful Palestinian state will be met decline when countries and UN bodies stop demanding them. Why bother going through the years of hard work to control violence, end terrorism, stop teaching hate in schools and mosques, build institutions, and negotiate peacefully with Israel, when the General Assembly is happy to give you a pass?

Still, that doesn’t mean this is a symbolic move without consequences:

This UN vote is not pure theater. It did not elevate “Palestine” to full membership in the United Nations, because only the Security Council can do that and a U.S. veto prevented it. But the General Assembly did upgrade “Palestine’s” presence: it is now seated among member states in alphabetical order. . . . It can do pretty much anything in the UN except vote.

As this newsletter noted last week, Gaza is not suffering from famine, and the efforts to suggest that it is—which have been going on since at least the beginning of last year—are based on deliberate manipulation of the data. Nor, as Shany Mor explains, does international law require Israel to feed its enemies:

Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does oblige High Contracting Parties to allow for the free passage of medical and religious supplies along with “essential foodstuff, clothing, and tonics intended for children under fifteen” for the civilians of another High Contracting Party, as long as there is no serious reason for fearing that “the consignments may be diverted from their destination,” or “that a definite advantage may accrue to the military efforts or economy of the enemy” by the provision.

The Hamas regime in Gaza is, of course, not a High Contracting Party, and, more importantly, Israel has reason to fear both that aid provisions are diverted by Hamas and that a direct advantage is accrued to it by such diversions. Not only does Hamas take provisions for its own forces, but its authorities sell provisions donated by foreign bodies and use the money to finance its war. It’s notable that the first reports of Hamas’s financial difficulties emerged only in the past few weeks, once provisions were blocked.

Yet, since the war began, even European states considered friendly to Israel have repeatedly demanded that Israel “allow unhindered passage of humanitarian aid” and refrain from seizing territory or imposing “demographic change”—which means, in practice, that Gazan civilians can’t seek refuge abroad. These principles don’t merely constitute a separate system of international law that applies only to Israel, but prolong the suffering of the people they are ostensibly meant to protect:

By insisting that Hamas can’t lose any territory in the war it launched, the international community has invented a norm that never before existed and removed one of the few levers Israel has to pressure it to end the war and release the hostages.

These commitments have . . . made the plight of the hostages much worse and much longer. They made the war much longer than necessary and much deadlier for both sides. And they locked a large civilian population in a war zone where the de-facto governing authority was not only indifferent to civilian losses on its own side, but actually had much to gain by it.