According to the most recent reports, the IDF believes it is close to dismantling the Hamas brigades operating in Rafah. This suggests that Jerusalem will soon have to make a decision about whether to focus its attention on destroying what remains of Hamas in Gaza or instead turn to Hizballah, which has been raining rockets and drones on northern Israel since October 8. Zvi Hauser explains how the two problems are related:

In the complex web of dilemmas facing Israeli decision-makers, the war to defeat the Hamas terror organization decisively must remain a cornerstone of policy and action. After October 7, there is no room for maneuver—any other outcome will have far-reaching consequences. A determined effort to achieve all our objectives in the Gaza Strip will also shake Hizballah’s secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah’s confidence in the effectiveness of his attrition strategy against Israel and provide him and Lebanese leaders with a stark illustration of the potential outcomes of a war with Israel. . . .

Targeting Hamas leaders will clarify that there is a price for their refusal [to accept ceasefire proposals]. While the difficulty in doing so regarding commanders in Gaza can be understood, it is not understandable regarding the organization’s leaders abroad, who star in the media and behave as if their immunity is guaranteed.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?