Since the IDF began its operations in and around the Gazan city of Rafah, at least five soldiers have been killed by explosive booby traps. Jonathan Schanzer examines the evidence that these deaths are the result of U.S. efforts to restrain Israel:

On the eve of the month-long Muslim holiday of Ramadan, in March, the White House warned Israel to halt its military advance on Rafah. The Israelis had removed Hamas from the vast majority of the Gaza Strip. The IDF was on the cusp of destroying the terrorist group, defying the predictions of most Middle East experts. The U.S. warned that war during Ramadan could lead to a multi-front conflict the Israelis wanted to avoid.

But when that month was over, and the Israelis readied for a renewal of the war, the White House moved the goal posts. The U.S. immediately began to warn of a potential humanitarian disaster in Gaza. The State Department went so far as to suggest that Israel could be guilty of war crimes in Rafah. The White House even threatened to halt the provision of ammunition to Israel, as a result of these purported fears. . . . Then, in mid-May, a major lawfare campaign against Israel kicked into high gear. . . .

The cumulative effect of all of this over the last three months has prompted the IDF to halt its advance in Rafah, and to move much more slowly than it originally anticipated. These three months of relative quiet afforded Hamas, and its terror masters in Tehran, the time and space to prepare the lethal booby traps and IEDs that are now killing the Israeli soldiers.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”