Meanwhile, Hamas announced yesterday that it rejects the recent American and Israeli offer for a cessation of hostilities and an exchange of hostages for prisoners. The U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan, however, told NBC that the offer remains on the table and negotiations are still ongoing. Robert Satloff takes a close look at one of the problems with the proposed deal: the U.S. promises to “ensure” (in President Biden’s words) that Israel fulfills its end of the bargain, and Egypt and Qatar have “assured” the president that they will hold Hamas to its obligations:
Egypt and Qatar have shown themselves to be woefully incapable of influencing Hamas over the past eight months, so the idea that there is any value in their “assurances” regarding the group’s future behavior is risible. By contrast, any U.S. administration necessarily has considerable leverage on Israel’s actions given Jerusalem’s reliance on U.S. rearmament and diplomatic backing to sustain its military operations.
This imbalance—in which the United States guarantees Israeli adherence while other states ineffectually guarantee a terrorist group’s adherence—sets a worrisome precedent that problematic actors will be eager to cut-and-paste into future deals.
But, Satloff explains, some of these problems could be fixed. For instance, the U.S. could promise “to punish Hamas through measures such as securing the arrest and extradition of Hamas leaders who reside in Qatar and elsewhere.” Thus far, Washington has made no indication that such steps have even been considered.
Read more on Washington Institute for Near East Policy: https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/improving-overlooked-aspect-gaza-ceasefire-proposal