If Hizballah were to attack Cyprus, it would be part of a general effort to bring the war to the eastern Mediterranean, which would be coordinated with the maritime front already opened by its Houthi allies in the Red Sea. Yesterday the Houthis appear to have attacked a commercial vessel much further from the shore than they have previously managed to. The same group sank a ship and killed a British mariner last week. James Stavridis, a retired U.S. admiral and the former supreme commander of NATO, chides the West for its “anemic, indecisive, and mostly defensive” response. Drawing on his extensive experience fighting pirates, Stavridis suggests a firmer approach:

What we learned was that to defeat pirates operating from bases ashore you need to go ashore and neutralize the attacks before they successfully get out to sea. Once the pirates or their weapons—missiles, drones, unmanned high-speed boats—are in the open seaway, the challenges multiply. When we began to strike the pirate bases ashore, capture or kill the pirates, and destroy their equipment, the threat gradually reduced. While the Houthis are far better trained, equipped, and organized thanks to their masters in Tehran, the same principle applies.

Stavridis explains what applying this strategy to the Houthis would entail, and then adds that

a campaign plan against the Houthis must include severing their supply chain back to Iran. This is challenging but not impossible. Clearly, Iran is providing not only intelligence but also hardware, including components for drones, ballistic missiles, and unmanned speed craft. . . . This may require striking Iranian assets directly, to include their intelligence-gathering ships in the Red Sea and North Arabian Sea; offshore Iranian intelligence-gathering platforms outside the Arabian Gulf; [and] Iranian logistic vessels moving weapons and components to Yemen.

Some may find direct strikes against Iranian sovereign assets too provocative. I’d invite anyone looking at the situation to reflect on the direct attacks thus far—now numbering in the dozens—of ballistic missiles and drones shot down (fortunately) by U.S. warships. If one of those ballistic missiles were to get through and strike a U.S. destroyer with a tightly packed crew of 350 sailors, we would be very close to a war with Iran. Better to send a strong signal now than to have to react with overwhelming firepower against Tehran after U.S. casualties.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.