Between October 8, 2023 and July 26, 2024, Hizballah has launched more than 5,000 rockets and numerous drones into northern Israel, depopulating border towns, destroying buildings and infrastructure, and leaving over twenty people dead. That was before Saturday’s rocket attack, which killed twelve Druze children in a soccer field. While Jerusalem mulls a much harsher response than anything it has done thus far, Hizballah has not pulled back; yesterday alone, it fired twenty rockets and a drone into Israel. Matthew Levitt, Hanin Ghaddar, David Schenker, and Assaf Orion discuss what an Israeli response could and should look like. Levitt comments:

Diplomacy is unlikely to forestall deeper conflict between the two sides, especially in the long term. . . . Hizballah is also unlikely to accept a diplomatic solution so long as it believes it can maintain the current tempo of fighting without risking full-fledged war.

In Israel, the October 7 attack completely changed the country’s perspective on external security threats, making it less likely to accept a perpetual Hizballah threat on its border or a diplomatic solution that simply kicks the can down the road regarding the group’s massive rocket and missile arsenal. Accordingly, as the conflict escalates, the U.S. role should be twofold: (1) to deter direct, large-scale Iranian involvement, if necessary through concerted joint military action of the sort seen when Tehran launched a direct strike on Israel this April, and (2) to target supply routes between Iran and its proxies more aggressively.

In other words, Levitt views the American role as using its military might to deter and weaken its and Israel’s shared enemies. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the White House’s own view of its role, which seems to be to urge restraint. Assaf Orion adds:

Iran presents another significant challenge, as it appears to have entered a new stage of aggression and risk-taking in support of its proxies. . . . Realistically, a diplomatic agreement would only resolve the current circumstances of active conflict.

When he called upon Hamas to end the war and release the hostages last week, the Palestinian Authority president Mahmoud Abbas was also getting ready for a reshuffle within his regime. On Saturday, he appointed Hussein al-Sheikh deputy president of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which is intimately tied to the PA itself. Al-Sheikh would therefore succeed Abbas—who is eighty-nine and reportedly in ill health—as head of the PLO if he should die or become incapacitated, and be positioned to succeed him as head of the PA as well.

Al-Sheikh spent eleven years in an Israeli prison and, writes Maurice Hirsch, was involved in planning a 2002 Jerusalem suicide bombing that killed three. Moreover, Hirsch writes, he “does not enjoy broad Palestinian popularity or support.”

Still, by appointing Al-Sheikh, Abbas has taken a step in the internal reforms he inaugurated last year in the hope that he could prove to the Biden administration and other relevant players that the PA was up to the task of governing the Gaza Strip. Neomi Neumann writes:

Abbas’s motivation for reform also appears rooted in the need to meet the expectations of Arab and European donors without compromising his authority. On April 14, the EU foreign-policy chief Kaja Kallas approved a three-year aid package worth 1.6 billion euros, including 620 million euros in direct budget support tied to reforms. Meanwhile, the French president Emmanuel Macron held a call with Abbas [earlier this month] and noted afterward that reforms are essential for the PA to be seen as a viable governing authority for Gaza—a telling remark given reports that Paris may soon recognize “the state of Palestine.”

In some cases, reforms appear targeted at specific regional partners. The idea of appointing a vice-president originated with Saudi Arabia.

In the near term, Abbas’s main goal appears to be preserving Arab and European support ahead of a major international conference in New York this June.