Between October 8, 2023 and July 26, 2024, Hizballah has launched more than 5,000 rockets and numerous drones into northern Israel, depopulating border towns, destroying buildings and infrastructure, and leaving over twenty people dead. That was before Saturday’s rocket attack, which killed twelve Druze children in a soccer field. While Jerusalem mulls a much harsher response than anything it has done thus far, Hizballah has not pulled back; yesterday alone, it fired twenty rockets and a drone into Israel. Matthew Levitt, Hanin Ghaddar, David Schenker, and Assaf Orion discuss what an Israeli response could and should look like. Levitt comments:

Diplomacy is unlikely to forestall deeper conflict between the two sides, especially in the long term. . . . Hizballah is also unlikely to accept a diplomatic solution so long as it believes it can maintain the current tempo of fighting without risking full-fledged war.

In Israel, the October 7 attack completely changed the country’s perspective on external security threats, making it less likely to accept a perpetual Hizballah threat on its border or a diplomatic solution that simply kicks the can down the road regarding the group’s massive rocket and missile arsenal. Accordingly, as the conflict escalates, the U.S. role should be twofold: (1) to deter direct, large-scale Iranian involvement, if necessary through concerted joint military action of the sort seen when Tehran launched a direct strike on Israel this April, and (2) to target supply routes between Iran and its proxies more aggressively.

In other words, Levitt views the American role as using its military might to deter and weaken its and Israel’s shared enemies. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the White House’s own view of its role, which seems to be to urge restraint. Assaf Orion adds:

Iran presents another significant challenge, as it appears to have entered a new stage of aggression and risk-taking in support of its proxies. . . . Realistically, a diplomatic agreement would only resolve the current circumstances of active conflict.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?