When the British mandatory authorities established the office of grand mufti in 1921, they also established the chief rabbinate, appointing one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi rabbi. Israel, after it declared statehood, decided to make the office part of the government apparatus. But now, for the first time, the office is unoccupied, due to a complex fight with the Supreme Court over the recognition of female rabbis, conflict-of-interest concerns regarding possible nepotism, and the resulting failure of the responsible government ministry to hold elections for the posts. Zvika Klein comments:

The first chief rabbi, Abraham Isaac Kook, was a visionary, a leader who sought to bridge the gaps between secular and religious Jewish communities. He wasn’t just another political figure in a rabbi’s cloak; he saw the secular Zionist movement as part of a divine plan. Kook famously said, “That which is holy will become renewed, and that which is new will become holy.” He believed that even the non-religious efforts to build the state would eventually align with Jewish spiritual life.

The current situation reflects a broader disconnection between Israel’s religious institutions and its diverse society. Once envisioned as a unifying force, the chief rabbinate has become entangled in political maneuvering and struggled to maintain its relevance. Many Israelis feel that the institution no longer serves their needs or represents their values. This moment of transition offers an opportunity for introspection and reform, potentially paving the way for a more inclusive and representative religious authority.

It’s worth noting that the two men appointed as interim chief rabbis are IDF veterans with impressive careers in public service. Both have dedicated themselves to addressing halakhic issues stemming from October 7 and the current war. One can only hope their appointment is a sign of an era of renewal for this institution.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.