When the British mandatory authorities established the office of grand mufti in 1921, they also established the chief rabbinate, appointing one Ashkenazi and one Sephardi rabbi. Israel, after it declared statehood, decided to make the office part of the government apparatus. But now, for the first time, the office is unoccupied, due to a complex fight with the Supreme Court over the recognition of female rabbis, conflict-of-interest concerns regarding possible nepotism, and the resulting failure of the responsible government ministry to hold elections for the posts. Zvika Klein comments:

The first chief rabbi, Abraham Isaac Kook, was a visionary, a leader who sought to bridge the gaps between secular and religious Jewish communities. He wasn’t just another political figure in a rabbi’s cloak; he saw the secular Zionist movement as part of a divine plan. Kook famously said, “That which is holy will become renewed, and that which is new will become holy.” He believed that even the non-religious efforts to build the state would eventually align with Jewish spiritual life.

The current situation reflects a broader disconnection between Israel’s religious institutions and its diverse society. Once envisioned as a unifying force, the chief rabbinate has become entangled in political maneuvering and struggled to maintain its relevance. Many Israelis feel that the institution no longer serves their needs or represents their values. This moment of transition offers an opportunity for introspection and reform, potentially paving the way for a more inclusive and representative religious authority.

It’s worth noting that the two men appointed as interim chief rabbis are IDF veterans with impressive careers in public service. Both have dedicated themselves to addressing halakhic issues stemming from October 7 and the current war. One can only hope their appointment is a sign of an era of renewal for this institution.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.