In the absence of a commission of inquiry, Israelis are drawing their own conclusions about October 7. A great number believe that the mistake lay in taking a defensive posture toward Hamas, and that the obvious lesson is that Hizballah should be preempted before it attempts an even more terrible attack on Israel’s north. At the same time, Israel’s war-weary citizen-soldiers and their families have little appetite for more fighting, even if they fear it may be necessary. Hizballah, for its part, fired a missile on Friday night that struck on Israeli barn and killed two horses. And yesterday, it launched a drone attack that left eighteen soldiers wounded.

The U.S., meanwhile, appears desperate to avoid a showdown in Lebanon. Hal Brands argues that the White House might be able to prevent one, if it takes a very different tack:

The key is ruthless coercive diplomacy. Hizballah is more likely to pull back, and Iran is more likely to counsel retrenchment, if they are convinced that America will aid Israel resolutely.

Biden must make clear that he will give Israel the time and resources it needs to decimate Hizballah—that there will be no early calls for a cease-fire, and that American bombs and bullets will flow. He should make clear, moreover, that Washington will inflict crushing punishment on Iran if Iran enters the conflict—as a way of convincing Hizballah that if it fights, it fights alone.

Unfortunately, the administration’s body language signals something different—a transparent, almost desperate desire for calm in the run-up to a crucial presidential vote. When Iran attacked Israel in April, for instance, the U.S.—after organizing a successful defense against Tehran’s drones and missiles—pivoted immediately to restraining the Israeli response.

As the risks in the Middle East rise, helping Israel make a credible threat of war may be the price of convincing Hizballah and Iran that they should swerve to avoid it.

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?