In an article in a recent issue of the journal Foreign Affairs, the retired American general David Petraeus contends that Israel’s current strategy in Gaza is wrongheaded. Instead, he argues, the IDF should adopt the counterinsurgency strategies (COIN in military jargon) that he employed so effectively to suppress the Iraqi insurgency between 2007 and 2010. Will Selber and Bill Roggio disagree:

There are numerous problems with this argument, chief among them that the IDF is not fighting an insurgency. Instead, it’s fighting a terror state. Hamas is the state. [Its members] are not insurgents. While Hamas may employ guerrilla-warfare tactics, so did the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The IDF would be fighting an insurgency if Hamas were trying to topple a government in Gaza. But that’s not what’s going on here. Yes, Hamas is a terrorist organization. However, they do not solely operate clandestinely because they are the de-facto state in Gaza. They field a terror army consisting of over twenty light infantry battalions.

Moreover, crucial to counterinsurgency is building trust with friendly locals, trust that is strengthened by fighting side by side:

Which group inside of Gaza could partner with the IDF like this and still survive? . . . The Palestinian Authority is still incapable of securing the West Bank. How would they secure Gaza working shoulder-by-shoulder with the IDF? [But] let’s play along, pretending that somehow the IDF could find a partner force. How long would it take to clear, hold, and build? A year? Maybe two? Wouldn’t the international community claim that Israel is occupying Gaza? Even Petraeus admits that this would require an Israeli occupation of Gaza.

While the IDF has yet to achieve its war aims and the overall success of its operation in Gaza remains in doubt, following in America’s footsteps in both Iraq and Afghanistan would be a cataclysmic mistake. We lost both wars. Israel cannot afford to lose this one.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”