Donald Trump’s selection of J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential nominee says much about the direction of the Republican party over the next few years. It is thus reassuring that Vance, whatever his other faults or merits, has been unreserved in his support for Israel, although he has taken pains to place this position in the context of what he presents as a Trumpist or “America-first” foreign policy. In Vance’s view the primary feature of this approach would be to abandon Ukraine and seek reconciliation with Russia—a close ally of Iran and supporter of Hamas.

Together with the recitation of a prayer for the release of Israeli hostages at the Republican National Convention, Vance’s positions are evidence of what David Weigel recently termed the “new anti-Israel right’s failure to launch.”

To the extent there’s been a debate over Israel within the right, it overlaps significantly with a separate internal fight over whether to purge fringe activists who have expressed anti-Semitic or white nationalist views. A study of voter opinion by the political scientist Michael Tesler found opposition to Israel aid within the GOP was heavily concentrated among voters who also view Jewish people unfavorably.

But the movement has gotten no serious traction inside the GOP. One reason: good, old-fashioned negative polarization. The Israel question divides Democrats, not Republicans. . . . The anti-war movement is overwhelmingly organized by left-wing activists whom Republicans already dislike, especially on campus. . . . That disgust has strengthened the already-robust Republican support for Israel, which has long united both religious conservatives and national-security hawks.

“A few years ago, any candidate—Republican or Democrat—could get on stage and say, ‘I stand with Israel’, and it was an automatic applause line,” said Sam Markstein, the Republican Jewish Coalition’s national political director. “These days, if you did that as a Democrat, you’d be booed.” Markstein predicted that his party wouldn’t budge: “Republicans know Israel must be given the time, space, and support it needs to win this war of good versus evil—Democrats, unfortunately, have totally lost the plot.”

It’s notable, as an aside, how much Weigel absorbs the distorted language and thinking of so much reporting on Israel: the war begun by Hamas is “Israel’s war”; the passage above refers to those calling for Israel’s annihilation as the “anti-war movement”; and the continuation of the conflict depends largely on whether the U.S. pressures Israel to “end” the war, presumably something distinct from winning it.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.