On Thursday, Hizballah launched over 200 rockets and drones at northern Israel. It fired dozens more rockets and missiles yesterday, seriously injuring two people—one of whom is an American citizen. Defense Minister Yoav Gallant visited a military outpost in northern Israel the same day, and stated that, even if a ceasefire is achieved with Hamas, the IDF will “continue to fight and do everything necessary” to combat the Iran-backed terrorist group.

Amiad Cohen and Caroline Glick discuss the looming possibility of an expanded war in the north, the reasons why it might not be in Israel’s interests in the short term, the role of the American alliance, and what the ultimate goal of such a war should be. (Video, 65 minutes. Also available on podcast platforms.)

Concluded in 1979, the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty ended nearly 30 years of intermittent warfare, and proved one of the most enduring and beneficial products of Middle East diplomacy. But Egypt may not have been upholding its end of the bargain, write Jonathan Schanzer and Mariam Wahba:

Article III, subsection two of the peace agreement’s preamble explicitly requires both parties “to ensure that that acts or threats of belligerency, hostility, or violence do not originate from and are not committed from within its territory.” This clause also mandates both parties to hold accountable any perpetrators of such acts.

Recent Israeli operations along the Philadelphi Corridor, the narrow strip of land bordering Egypt and Gaza, have uncovered multiple tunnels and access points used by Hamas—some in plain sight of Egyptian guard towers. While it could be argued that Egypt has lacked the capacity to tackle this problem, it is equally plausible that it lacks the will. Either way, it’s a serious problem.

Was Egypt motivated by money, amidst a steep and protracted economic decline in recent years? Did Cairo get paid off by Hamas, or its wealthy patron, Qatar? Did the Iranians play a role? Was Egypt threatened with violence and unrest by the Sinai’s Bedouin Union of Tribes, who are the primary profiteers of smuggling, if it did not allow the tunnels to operate? Or did the Sisi regime take part in this operation because of an ideological hatred of Israel?