Last month, Dave Deptula, who commanded U.S. air-force campaigns in Operation Desert Storm and in Afghanistan, became the first American general to visit the Gaza Strip since the current war began. Deptula explains the mechanics of Hamas’s sacrifice of Palestinian lives for propaganda purposes:

Hamas counts on media coverage and attention to civilian deaths to shift blame to Israel. The tactic it uses to do this is to stash weapons, explosives, or rockets into every structure where, or near where, they will be operating—mosques, hospitals, schools, shops, apartment buildings, and personal residences. They walk the streets in civilian clothes with no weapons, then duck into a building knowing where weapons are stored and use them against the IDF. They depart the building without any weapons, resuming their civilian appearance.

The IDF takes measures to minimize destruction when feasible and often subjects its own forces to substantial risk to mitigate civilian casualties. Indeed, the IDF refrains from attacking Hamas operatives when they brazenly interdict and steal humanitarian supplies to avoid additional killings and violence.

Deptula notes another, less-remarked-upon tactic that may have considerably slowed the progress of the war:

Hamas also sought to gain a shielding effect from Israel’s obvious interest in avoiding confrontation with Egypt. I drove past Hamas rocket-launch positions located feet from Gaza’s border with Egypt. Hamas positioned them there, using the co-location of their rocket launch positions and the border knowing that the Israeli air force would not strike positions so close to Egypt.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.