Last week, a United Nations internal investigation determined that nine employees of the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) had taken an active part in terrorist actives during or after October 7. But this isn’t the most scandalous thing about this agency. David May and Richard Goldberg write:

UNRWA was established after Israel’s founding as a relief agency for Palestinian refugees, but in practice, it has helped perpetuate the Arab-Israeli conflict. . . . Multiple investigations of UNRWA schools and their staff have found widespread dissemination of anti-Semitism, support for terrorism, and even praise of Hitler. October 7 was the logical conclusion of decades of UNRWA hate-mongering and incitement.

Averting its gaze from UNRWA’s inexcusable ties to Hamas, the Biden administration recently joined a multilateral effort to affirm the agency’s central role in Gaza, encouraging U.S. allies to give money—even though Congress has (for now) blocked American funding.

Ample evidence exists for Washington to impose terrorism sanctions on UNRWA. Secondary financial sanctions would force banks to halt transactions conducted on UNRWA’s behalf, cutting off its access to other donor funds as well. Congress can impose such sanctions via legislation.

Small in area and population and rich in natural gas, Qatar plays an outsize role in the Middle East. While its support keeps Hamas in business, it also has vital relations with Israel that are much better than those enjoyed by many other Arab countries. Doha’s relationship with Washington, though more complex, isn’t so different. Yoel Guzansky offers a comprehensive examination of Israel’s Qatar dilemma:

At first glance, Qatar’s foreign policy seems filled with contradictions. Since 1995, it has pursued a strategy of diplomatic hedging—building relationships with multiple, often competing, actors. Qatar’s vast wealth and close ties with the United States have enabled it to maneuver independently on the international stage, maintaining relations with rival factions, including those that are direct adversaries.

Qatar plays an active role in international diplomacy, engaging in conflict mediation in over twenty regions worldwide. While not all of its mediation efforts have been successful, they have helped boost its international prestige, which it considers vital for its survival among larger and more powerful neighbors. Qatar has participated in mediation efforts in Venezuela, Lebanon, Iran, Afghanistan, and other conflict zones, reinforcing its image as a neutral broker.

Israel’s stated objective of removing Hamas from power in Gaza is fundamentally at odds with Qatar’s interest in keeping Hamas as the governing force. In theory, if the Israeli hostages would to be released, Israel could break free from its dependence on Qatari mediation. However, it is likely that even after such a development, Qatar will continue positioning itself as a mediator—particularly in enforcing agreements and shaping Gaza’s reconstruction efforts.

Qatar’s position is strengthened further by its good relations with the U.S. Yet, Guzansky notes, it has weaknesses as well that Israel could exploit:

Qatar is highly sensitive to its global image and prides itself on maintaining a neutral diplomatic posture. If Israel chooses to undermine Qatar’s reputation, it could target specific aspects of Qatari activity that are problematic from an Israeli perspective.